THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A quarterly journal of philosophy

Volume XXXIV, ~~Number 1~~ NOVEMBER 1956

THE COURSE OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM
John A. Dinneen, S.J.

THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN PLOTINUS
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NOTES AND DISCUSSION

GROTIUS ON THE LAW OF WAR
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Chronicle

BOOK REVIEWS

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is published in November, January, March, and May. Subscription price, $4.00 a year; foreign subscriptions, $4.20 a year (in France, 1550 fr.); single copies, $1.25 each. THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN is indexed in the *Catholic Periodical Index*. Copyright ©, 1956, by THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN, Saint Louis, Missouri. Permission is required to reprint an article or part of an article.

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Entered as second-class matter December 1, 1923, at the post office at Saint Louis, Missouri, under the Act of March 3, 1879. Acceptance for mailing at special rate of postage provided for in section 1103, Act of October 3, 1917, authorized on January 15, 1929.

Printed in the U.S.A. by E. W. Stephens Co., Columbia, Missouri

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THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN

A quarterly journal of philosophy

November 1956 to May 1957 **VOLUME XXXIV**

Saint Louis University

The College of Philosophy and Letters and the Department of Philosophy, SAINT LOUIS

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John A. Dinneen, s.j.

THE COURSE OF LOGICAL POSITIVISM

Mr. John A. Dinneen, s.j. *received his M.A. from Loyola University (Chicago). He is an instructor in philosophy at Saint Peter's College (Jersey City). He has previously written for* The Catholic World.

I. The Origin and Growth of Logical Positivism

In 1922, there began at the University of Vienna a seminar led by the physicist-philosopher Professor Moritz Schlick. The membership of this seminar group was, in large measure, composed of "amateur" philosophers. They were men whose main or original specialization lay in other fields of knowledge. The original members included, to mention a few, Victor Kraft, a historian; Hans Hahn, a mathematician; Felix Kaufmann, a lawyer; Otto Neurath, a sociologist; and Kurt Reidemeister, a mathematician. And among the numerous visitors who swelled their ranks were such men as the Prague physicist Philipp Frank and Alfred J. Ayer of Oxford.

These meetings quickly came to life in 1926 with the arrival of Rudolf Carnap. His *Logische Aufbau der Welt*—and also Ludwig Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*—were full and precise statements of the early philosophizing of this group and the basis of long discussions. Out of these two works came the first real philosophical position of logical positivism.

During the course of these meetings, it was suggested that a name be adopted for the group in order to lend a pleasant aspect to their purposes and to connect them with the quiet university life of Vienna. The name adopted accomplished all this and even more, when the nucleus of this new movement became known as the Vienna Circle. Thus in the borderland of German idealistic influence emerged this modern form of empiricism.

In 1936, however, the meetings ended abruptly with the assassina-

tion of Professor Schlick by a former student. But the new philosophy, which had its beginning here, did not end with the Vienna Circle. Other movements, in Europe and America, followed; and the philosophy of logical positivism, with its great attraction for men of science, continued to grow with the scientific spirit of the age.

Perhaps nowhere today has the positivist movement gained greater momentum than in the United States. This is due, in part, to our own philosophical background and, in part, to the anticultural and anti-semitic policies of Nazism which caused the emigration of several of the leading figures in the movement to this country. Among the group were Rudolf Carnap, Hans Reichenbach, Philipp Frank, Richard von Mises, Herbert Feigl, and Carl Hempel. The influence of these men has indeed been wide, stemming, as it does, from many of our major Universities—Chicago, California, Harvard, Minnesota, and Princeton.

Logical positivism, however, is not something entirely new in the history of thought. Insistence on experience and the experimental trial-and-error method has characterized many a philosophical position. In antiquity, we find the Sophists, Stoics, and Epicureans; in the Middle Ages, the nominalists. Modern times have witnessed a greater development of this line of thought, with Bacon, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Bentham, J. S. Mill, and Spencer in England and, in France, D'Alembert, Saint-Simon, Comte, and Poincaré.

Of this group, David Hume seems to have played the most significant role in the genesis of modern positivism. At least two conclusions of his empirical hypotheses bear close resemblance to common positivist tenets; namely, that the sphere of deductive reasoning is closed to statements about matters of fact and, secondly, that factual statements can ultimately be reduced to statements concerned solely with sense experience.

Auguste Comte, although of the "positive" family, does not bear the close ties of kinship with the modern movement that one might suspect. Any transempirical philosophy, for Comte, had simply outlived its usefulness. Consequently, the only "positive" sciences are

[1]C. S. Peirce, "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," *Collected Papers*, Vol. I: *Principles of Philosophy*, ed. Hartshorne and Weiss (Harvard Univ. Press, 1931), Pars. 400 and 402.

[2]William James, *Pragmatism* (New York, 1912), pp. 53 and 200.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 201.

mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, and sociology. There is a gap between these six basic sciences, however, which eliminates the possibility of a "unity of science." Since the logical positivist insists that *all* scientific statements can be reduced to statements of sensations, it appears that he is closer to British empirical thought than to French materialist speculation.

The United States, too, has had a history of empiricism. Positivism found rich ground for growth in the soil tilled by pragmatism, instrumentalism, and operationalism. The writings of Charles S. Peirce and especially his essay, "How to Make Our Ideas Clear," gave great impetus to the philosophic movement of pragmatism in this country. The meaning of a statement, Peirce wrote, consists in the sum of its verifiable consequences. There could be no difference in meaning that did not make a difference in practice.[1] Peirce, moreover, like the contemporary British philosopher and scientist Bertrand Russell, combined this attraction for the empirical with a deep interest in symbolic logic—a combination that is the hallmark of logical positivism.

Peirce's close friend, William James, continued to develop the philosophy of pragmatism. In his *Pragmatism,* James stresses continually the relationship of a term's meaning to its "cash value in experiential terms."[2] A statement has meaning, then, if it has experiential consequences and these consequences constitute the very meaning of the statement. The truth of an idea, consequently, is a process, "the process namely of its verifying itself, its verification."[3] (For present purposes we omit a consideration of James's second criterion of meaning and truth, developed in his theory of the "will to believe.")

Other pragmatic theories followed that of James, the instrumentalism of Dewey and the operationalism of Bridgeman, all of which tied American philosophical thought more closely to the empirical.

How, then, may we describe the philosophy of contemporary logical positivism? John Laird's description is amusing but nonetheless true:

> By positivism in its most general sense we mean the theory that if you want to know anything about anything, you must either make an appointment with one of the sciences or else be content

to be cheated. Outside the sciences there is no information. The poets may beguile you or exalt you but they cannot tell you anything. Theologians may bewilder you, philosophers may rack you, and rhetoricians may soothe you. But none of them can tell you anything.[4]

The positivist, to stress the obvious, is a man completely devoted to science and the scientific method. History, he will argue, speaks for itself. For nearly two thousand years, from the time of Aristotle, progress and discovery in science were relatively slow and small. Then, in the sixteenth century, something momentous happened. Success became the order of the day, achievements multiplied, advances were made by leaps and bounds. The names of Copernicus, Francis Bacon, Galileo, Kepler, and Newton date the beginnings of the rich harvest of science.

In the centuries that followed, man was relieved of many of the burdens formerly imposed by space and time. Medicine prolonged his life and lessened his sufferings; mechanics and chemistry gave him a relative mastery over space and time; electricity gave him the light and force that a highly productive civilization needs; and now, at the beginning of the atomic age, there seems no end to what science can accomplish.

Because of this rich fruitfulness of science, the positivist concludes that scientific methods be required of *all* fields of human knowledge. In particular, philosophy must disengage itself from the sterile speculation of the past and must proceed along scientific lines. In short, the quite valid methodology of one discipline is quite invalidly demanded of all disciplines.

As the name "logical positivism" would imply, attention to mathematics and logic and emphasis on the linguistic aspects of traditional philosophical problems appear as indelible marks distinguishing logical positivists from the early empiricists. Positivism (systematically) approaches the problem of meaning by means of a logical analysis of language in distinction to the earlier and more psychologically orientated forms of empiricism, positivism, and pragmatism. This is the *logic* of logical positivism.

[4] "Positivism, Empiricism and Metaphysics," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, XXXIX (1938-39), 240.

[5] *The Vienna Circle* (New York, 1953), pp. 23-24.

Thus the coupling of sense perception and logic is what differentiates positivism from the older empiricism. As Victor Kraft argues, the positivists have combined the insight into the a-priori nature of logic and mathematics with the empiricist tenet of validation by experience alone.[5] Previously, Kraft continues, most of the philosophers who recognized this a-priori nature were apriorists even with regard to knowledge of reality. Empiricists, on the other hand, failed to see this a-priori nature of logic and mathematics, holding that all knowledge and science are derived from experience as the sole ground of validity. The Vienna Circle restricted the empiricist thesis to factual knowledge. All factual knowledge, they maintained, is derived from experience and can be validated by experience alone. The core of empiricism was thereby preserved. Though recognizing the a-priori validity of logic and mathematics, the early positivists did not veer toward some type of rationalism with respect to factual knowledge, since neither logic nor mathematics makes any *factual* assertions at all.

This last notion of nonfactual assertions (which the positivist calls tautologies or analytic statements) requires greater development, as it is essential for an understanding of philosophic positivism. Long before the Vienna Circle began its discussions, Immanuel Kant had focused attention on one important noetic fact which no succeeding philosopher could seriously deny. Kant saw clearly that the acquisition of empirical data would not be true human knowledge until it had taken on the forms of the categories. In other words, a perception of an existing other could not be rendered meaningful unless subsumed under some class or concept. Sheer empiricism consequently is impossible. In this sense Kant's famous dictum is not altogether erroneous; namely, that perception without concepts is blind and concepts without perception are empty.

For Kant, however, there is a structural necessity to think according to definite forms or categories. Kantian philosophy, as a consequence, petrified notions of Newtonian physics in its explanation of the space-time category. Positivists were fully conscious of this deficiency and endeavored to formulate a doctrine which would leave room for the evolution of science.

Two philosopher-scientists, Ernst Mach and Henri Poincaré, disputed a solution to this difficulty. The question before them was, in essence, What are class notions? Considering the problem on the scientific level, they asked, "What are the general principles of science?" According to Mach, they are abbreviated economical descriptions of observed facts; according to Poincaré, they are free creations of the human mind which do not tell anything about observed facts.[6] An attempt to integrate the two concepts into one coherent system led to the development of logical positivism. For the positivist all class concepts and generalizations are pure constructions of the mind. They are neither real and objective nor a-priori determinations of the mind; they are merely arbitrary conventions about how to use some words or expressions. They function as tools of the mind to aid in the correlation of sense data. But such constructions may have factual import, according to positivists, provided they in no way refer to what is, in principle, beyond sense observation. In brief, the whole *content* of class must be empirical.

This whole positivist scheme offered much more possibility of synthesis and unity than the older form of empiricism. By adding the device of logic and mathematics, it brought about some manageable control of empirical data. In contrast with pragmatism and operationalism, positivism formulated its criteria of meaning in a strictly logical way, which satisfied the rigid requirements of a formal science. These were undoubtedly strong reasons why professional scientists and logicians were drawn to the philosophy of positivism.

What, then, did philosophy become on positivist terms? Philosophy could be no more than the mental activity of classification of ideas. It is logical analysis; that is, a clarification of the language used in everyday life. In short, philosophy became logic. Numerous centers of positivism have arisen, all embodying this conception of philosophy. In the United States we find the schools of Carnap, Frank, and Reichenbach, and the Chicago school of Charles W. Morris; in England, there is the Cambridge school, divided into groups under Russell and Wittgenstein; and finally the Oxford school of Alfred Ayer.

[6]Philipp Frank, *Modern Science and Its Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1949), pp. 6-9.

[7]Cf. B. A. Farrell, "An Appraisal of Therapeutic Positivism," I, *Mind,* LV (January, 1946), 25-48; "An Appraisal of Therapeutic Positivism," II, *Mind,* LV (April, 1946), 133-50.

It was Wittgenstein, however, who was the first to emphasize that the traditional problems of philosophy are nothing but verbal problems. The school of philosophic method under his leadership at Cambridge, called "therapeutic positivism," maintains that philosophy is not a discipline aiming at some superior type of knowledge or intellectual discovery but only a method of revealing the linguistic confusions that gave rise to philosophical problems and of solving those problems simply by showing there were no genuine problems to begin with.[7] It is undoubtedly due in large measure to Wittgenstein that we find the positivist preoccupation with semantics (an analysis of the meaning of terms and expressions) and with syntax (the formal analysis of sentence structure).

No matter what the predominant influences, the friendly little discussion group called the "Vienna Circle" set in motion a new movement of empiricism which spread throughout Europe and the United States.

II. The Decline of Logical Positivism

The problem of *meaning* is undoubtedly the most important and most widely debated topic in positivist circles today. For an understanding of the positivist's stand, moreover, his view of *meaning* is basic, for on it depends the sum total of his philosophical tenets and conclusions. Since the "principle of verifiability" signifies an essential generalization of this view, a critical analysis of the verifiability principle seems the tool most apt for evaluating the philosophy of contemporary positivists.

The positivist, we noted previously, stands in awe of the luminous achievements of modern science. As a result, he claims that all questions of fact, of whatever branch of knowledge, can be decided by the empirical methods of science alone. So with regard to the general concept of *meaning*, he infers logically that the meaning of a statement is the method of its verification. This is the verification principle in its simplest form. Whether the individual positivist wishes to equate verification with the meaning of a statement or simply to make it the test of meaning will make little difference in practice. His two

chief problems concern the question of *meaning* and the question of verification. The former asks under what conditions a sentence has meaning; the latter, how we discover whether a sentence is true or false. The second question presupposes the first and, in a certain sense, there is only one answer to both problems. For, from a positivist's view, to know what it would be for a sentence to be true is to know its meaning. And if the truth-conditions be impossible even to imagine, the sentence is simply meaningless.

There is a further notion, however, which is essential for an understanding of the verification principle; that is, the distinction between practical verifiability and verifiability in principle. All positivists insist that verifiability is not a matter of the physical possibility of verification, much less of actual verification. Rather, verifiability refers only to the *logical* possibility of observation. To determine meaningfulness, one need only be able to conceive of observations that would confirm or deny a proposition. The statement "Rivers flow uphill" may be physically impossible to verify, yet it is logically possible or verifiable in principle and hence meaningful.

What has been said so far concerning the verification principle is general enough and would be agreeable to positivists of all shades and hues. But since positivists determine the meaning of reality-sentences by their verifiability, the exact formulation of the verification principle is going to be of the utmost importance to them. And it is here that differences of opinion begin. For purposes of analysis we shall indicate the qualifications and revisions of this principle, made on the positivists' own seeing, to determine whether or not such a criterion of meaning is the panacea of philosophical ills it is made out to be. Alfred J. Ayer's formulation of the principle will merit extensive consideration. For, in Ayer, there is the self-acknowledged influence of Berkeley and Hume, of Russell and Wittgenstein, and particularly of the members of the Vienna Circle. His *Language, Truth and Logic,* furthermore, was the first clear and full presentation by an English writer of common positivist doctrines and, in addition,

[8]"Meaning and Verification," *Readings in Philosophical Analysis,* ed. Feigl and Sellars (New York, 1949), p. 148.

[9]*Language, Truth and Logic* (New York, 1940), p. 37.

[10]"Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," *Revue internationale de philosophie,* IX (1950), 46.

[11]"Symposium: Verifiability," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society,* Suppl. XIX, 126-27.

offers a detailed and revised account of the verification principle.

In general terms, the verification principle may be stated as follows: A sentence is factually significant if, and only if, some observations would be relevant to its truth or falsity. Sense experience alone, then, constitutes factual meaningfulness, and positivism is clearly just a modern version of the old theme of empiricism.

The original and most familiar statement of the verification principle was given by Professor Moritz Schlick in this form: "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification."[8] Schlick's views can be considered embryonic—the first, rudimentary contentions upon which the original logical positivists' speculations were built. The difficulty with Schlick's criterion, as argued by positivists, was that it demanded conclusive verifiability as a test of meaning—that is, a proposition could be said to be meaningful only if its truth could be conclusively established in experience.

The main reason for the positivist rejection of conclusive verifiability is that it rules out all propositions of universal form and thus all statements expressing general laws. General propositions, Ayer explains, by nature cover an infinite number of cases and no finite series of observations could possibly establish them with certainty.[9] Consequently, if conclusive verifiability is upheld, general propositions must be regarded as pieces of nonsense. But propositions of universal form constitute an integral part of scientific theories, argues Carl Hempel, who therefore rejects Schlick's criterion as overly restrictive.[10] F. Waismann is in substantial agreement with both Hempel and Ayer but adds that conclusive verifiability must be abandoned not only because of the unlimited number of tests involved but also because of the "open texture" of the terms themselves; that is, the possibility of some totally new experiences or of new discoveries affecting the interpretation of presently accepted facts.[11] All these same arguments, furthermore, would apply to a substitute criterion advanced by Karl Popper, the criterion of complete falsifiability.

Thus Professor Schlick's criterion has been abandoned by present-day positivists. But the arguments traced above bring to light the definite relative notion that will be contained in any new criterion of meaning. As pragmatists assert, there can be no absolute truths,

for the future may always change things. In like manner, positivists reject the very notion of "absolute," since they can admit only a relative confirmation, to a greater or less degree, of any factual statement whatever. Indeed, Neurath and Popper have argued for the substitution of *confirmed* and *unconfirmed* in place of *true* and *false*.[12] Carnap, too, has spoken against the notion of absolute, suggesting that the mathematical laws of probability replace traditional truth-values.[13] The absolute for the positivist is simply nonsensical.

So in light of the inadequacies of the early criteria, positivists were forced to reformulate the verification principle if it was to serve as a satisfactory criterion of meaning. Alfred J. Ayer, and more contemporary positivists with him, have adopted weak or inconclusive verifiability as that criterion.

A sentence is verifiable in a weak or inconclusive sense, Professor Ayer explains, not if its truth can be definitely established in experience, but simply if experience can render it probable. Employing this more liberal criterion, he states the new criterion of factual meaning of a proposition in question form: "Would any observations be relevant to the determination of its truth or falsehood?"[14] From Ayer's view, the meaning-dogma has been elevated to its throne and any statement that fails to meet its demands must forfeit its right to factual meaning. Of importance to note is that, by means of the verification principle, Ayer has segregated factual statements from all others. The residue will be made up of tautologies and nonsense.

Tautologies or analytic statements play an important role in positivist philosophy and must be considered at some length. The tautological purports to assert nothing of fact; it is purely a priori. Its whole function, according to Ayer, is to render explicit unsuspected and implicit implications of one's assertions and beliefs.[15] In short, the tautological makes for consistency in logical relationships. For this reason, tautologies are not pieces of nonsense but give us a special kind of knowledge. Precisely because they say nothing about reality, they cannot be confuted and are therefore certain.

Included in the tautological order are not only logic and mathematics but all class concepts and all universal ideas as well. The

[12]Kraft, *The Vienna Circle*, p. 149.
[13]*Logical Foundations of Probability* (Chicago, 1950), p. 177.
[14]*Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 38.
[15]*Ibid.*, pp. 79-81.
[16]*Ibid.*, p. 81.

positivist is neither a realist nor a Kantian in regard to class knowledge. Class notions have no objective validity whatever; nor are they products of some a-priori determinations of the mind to think according to certain categories. For the positivist, the only real is the empirical, and class concepts are free creations of the human mind—arbitrary conventions which serve as shorthand controls of empirical data.

The positivist explanation of class concepts, however, as complete and free creations of the mind, will not stand up under an analysis of knowledge. Very generally, there can be no object of the human mind which is absolutely and completely constructed by the mind without some initial point of departure in experience. Even mathematics must have some starting point in experience, though the slightest. And in such cases where there is partial construction, we are aware of this in reflection.

But more specifically, class knowledge as well cannot be simply and totally a matter of mental construction—there is always a datum, a given. For from a phenomenological view of knowledge, the mind *encounters* its object; it does not *make* it. Now, positivists claim that the given is merely sensory and nothing more. But no true human experience can be purely sensory; some nonsensory element is always included which categorizes the sense datum and renders it meaningful. To the extent that I am able to verify "This is an animal" by some perception, what I perceive must be "animality" in this. In other words, the datum includes a class, a universal. This would be basic no matter how the relationship of class and inferior is explained and no matter what the ultimate psychological and metaphysical explanation. In any case, with his rejection of this datum, the positivist can never offer an adequate explanation of the phenomenon of knowledge.

Now, Ayer and positivists in general, furthermore, insist that the tautological order is not only arbitrary and completely independent of experience but that it is also completely independent of the nature of the mind. There are absolutely no "laws of thought." The laws of identity and noncontradiction, according to Ayer, are purely arbitrary conventions, valid in their own right, and do not even depend upon incorporation into a system.[16] In brief, they are

valid by virtue of their form alone. It is perfectly conceivable to Ayer that we could have employed different linguistic conventions and that a hundred years from now men may think according to different rules. This is nothing else but intellectual suicide.

Ayer notwithstanding, man is capable of knowing being and the principles which necessarily follow upon being. In reflection he realizes that his intellect is moved to assent by the evidence of being; he realizes that being, the whole of reality, is the object of his knowledge and that this object is intelligible. By knowledge of being, then, man at least implicitly understands that "being is" and that "being cannot be and not be at the same time under the same respect." To this necessity *ex parte rei* there corresponds a necessity *ex parte mentis*. Since man's assent is determined by the evidence of being, the principles of identity and noncontradiction are absolute necessities of thought precisely because identity and noncontradiction are intrinsic necessities of being. These principles cannot be arbitrary conventions of linguistic use; they transcend language and have their roots in being itself. Human thought contrary to these principles is simply impossible.

In our analysis so far we have seen Ayer's criterion of factual meaning; namely, verifiability in principle. The tautological or analytic, though devoid of factual meaning, is nonetheless meaningful within its own framework. A genuine proposition—and this corresponds roughly to Hume's "relations of ideas" and "matters of fact"—is either a priori or empirical. Ayer concludes, then, that any statement which is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable is nonsensical. All metaphysical—that is, all nonempirical statements of existential import—are reduced to nonsense. The razor of verifiability has indeed cut away a good deal of the flesh of human knowledge.

On what grounds now does Ayer reject metaphysics as meaningless? On strictly metaphysical grounds. According to the verification principle, a statement whose validity cannot be tested by sense observation is nonsensical. The only real, consequently, is the empirical. The verification principle is itself a metaphysical statement concerning

[17]"Meaninglessness," *Mind*, XLV, 353.

[18]John Laird, "Positivism, Empiricism and Metaphysics," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, XXXIX, 218.

[19]"Aspects of Positivism," *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research*, XII (March, 1953), 382-83.

the nature of reality, a metaphysic of empiricism dressed up in twentieth-century clothes. To identify verifiability with verifiability by sense experience, to limit the real to the sensible, is an arbitrary assumption which begs the whole question of epistemology and metaphysics from the start.

Let us review the arguments of several philosophers who bring to light the arbitrary and metaphysical character of Ayer's antimetaphysical views. Dr. A. C. Ewing, first of all, asks how the positivist establishes the truth of his view that sense observation is the sole determinant of factual meaning.[17] This cannot be shown to be true even in a single case of sense experience, argues Ewing. For how could the positivist ever know by sense experience that there is not a part of the meaning of a statement which he simply cannot verify? And the fact that we do not have any sense experience of the part in question proves nothing, since the whole question is whether there is something in what we mean that transcends the empirical. But how could the positivist know by sense experience that there is not? At the outset, the verification principle must be an arbitrary limitation on the scope of human experience and a metaphysical assertion limiting reality to the empirical.

John Laird brings out essentially the same point in a variant argument. Any form of empiricism, Laird contends, is a metaphysic—a doctrine about ultimates, asserting that, for any human thinker, the only ultimates are contained in human *empeiria*.[18] Should the positivist deny he is asserting anything ultimate, he continues, there is still no way out. The positivist is caught between the horns of a dilemma: either he gives no reason for his insistence on sensory experience, and his doctrine becomes purely arbitrary; or he gives a reason which, on his own showing, is merely provisional and not ultimate. In that case, he would ostensibly be refraining from metaphysics out of policy but would covertly be admitting that there are ultimate reasons for his position. Positivists are not antimetaphysicians, then, but only metaphysicians in disguise.

Raphael Demos, finally, exposes the capricious nature of the positivist stand in a most emphatic way.[19] On the positivist's own principles, we recall, one does not challenge rules; they are arbitrary

conventions valid in virtue of their form alone. Now, the positivist is the close friend of modern science and makes it clear that *this* is what *we mean* by evidence in science. All well and good, says Demos, but we mean something more by evidence in metaphysics. If rules are purely arbitrary and if the metaphysician does not adopt the rules of the scientist—as the positivist deplores he does not—by what right does he criticize the metaphysician for not conforming to the rules of the scientist? Why should he question the rules of the metaphysician at all?

The same general objection may be applied to the positivist doctrine of meaning. On what basis does the positivist determine the meaning of *meaning*? His only criterion is the linguistic usage of science. But, once again, the linguistic usage in metaphysics is that *meaning* does not mean the same as in science. Nonetheless, positivists criticize the metaphysician for not conforming to scientific usage, which, as Demos remarks, "is like scolding somebody for speaking French according to French grammar and contrary to English grammar."[20]

Clearly, the verification principle arbitrarily limits evidence and meaning and rejects metaphysics because the principle itself involves a metaphysics. Indeed, the positivist cannot help adopting some theory of the universe, some world view, to serve as the foundation stones of his views on science, history, psychology, ethics, theology, and so on. The verification principle, however, in destroying metaphysics, necessarily destroys itself. It destroys itself precisely because it itself is a metaphysic and because it includes in the realm of nonsense the philosophical principles on which its own conclusions depend.

But let us return to Professor Ayer's formulation of the verification principle. A statement has factual meaning, he argued, only if observations can be made which would be relevant to its truth or falsehood. But has any philosopher, to the most extreme sceptic or idealist, ever made a statement to the truth of which he did not think some observation or other was relevant? On the same point, Isaiah Berlin contends that *relevance* is not a precise logical category, realizing that

[20] *Ibid.*, 383.

[21] "Verifiability in Principle," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, XXXIX, 233.

[22] *Language, Truth and Logic*, pp. 38-39.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

"fantastic metaphysical systems" are free to claim that observations are relevant to their truth.[21]

To avoid this difficulty, Ayer attempts another formulation of the verification principle. He states it thus:

> . . . it is the mark of a genuine proposition, not that it should be equivalent to an experimental proposition [one which records an actual or possible observation], or any finite number of experimental propositions, but simply that some experimental propositions can be deduced from it in conjunction with certain other premises without being deducible from those premises alone.[22]

It is to be noted, first of all, that this formulation involves some inferential process. But how can Ayer know from sense experience alone whether an inference is legitimate or not? Surely not from logic or mathematics, for these sciences are tautological, saying nothing at all about reality—and presumably Professor Ayer is saying something of factual import. Since the principles of inference assuredly cannot be objects of empirical observation, how can Ayer determine the validity of any inferential process?

Perhaps a more embarrassing difficulty is that now the verification principle allows meaning to any statement whatsoever. Ayer himself admits this deficiency in the revised edition of *Language, Truth, and Logic,* giving the example,

> . . . the statements "the absolute is lazy" and "if the absolute is lazy, this is white" jointly entail the observation-statement "this is white" and since "this is white" does not follow from either of these premises, taken by itself, both of them satisfy my criterion of meaning.[23]

To emend the difficulty by leaving out the part about other premises would exclude hypotheticals from the class of empirical propositions and, therefore, make nonsense of scientific theories. So Professor Ayer attempts to meet the difficulty by still another formulation of the verification principle. Though more lengthy and involved than the original formulation, it deserves quotation in full:

> . . . a statement is directly verifiable if it is either itself an ob-

servation-statement, or is such that in conjunction with one or more observation-statements it entails at least one observation-statement which is not deducible from these other premises alone; and . . . a statement is indirectly verifiable if it satisfies the following conditions: first, that in conjunction with certain other premises it entails one or more directly verifiable statements which are not deducible from these other premises alone; and secondly, that these other premises do not include any statement that is not either analytic, or directly verifiable, or capable of being independently established as indirectly verifiable.[24]

A statement has factual meaning, then, if it is either directly or indirectly verifiable.

It is interesting to note what positivists themselves have to say about Ayer's revised criterion. According to Carl Hempel, this criterion, like Popper's criterion of complete falsifiability, allows factual significance to any conjunction whatever. An explanation of terminology may be necessary to follow Hempel's reasoning. By *S.N.* he means the expression obtained by connecting two sentences by the word *and*—for example, "all swans are white and the absolute is perfect." Take the conjunction *S.N.*, where *S* satisfies Ayer's criterion, while *N* is a statement like "the absolute is perfect," which is to be rejected by the same criterion. Hempel points out, however, that

> . . . whatever consequences can be deduced from S with the help of legitimate subsidiary hypotheses can also be deduced from S.N. by means of the same subsidiary hypotheses, and as Ayer's new criterion is formulated essentially in terms of the deducibility of a certain type of consequence from the given sentence, it countenances S.N. along with S.[25]

And Professor A. Church makes substantially the same point in his review of Ayer's second edition of *Language, Truth and Logic*.[26]

The verification principle becomes more and more suspect and Ayer

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 13.

[25] Hempel, "Problems and Changes in the Empiricist Criterion of Meaning," *Revue internationale de philosophie*, IX (1950), 50.

[26] *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, XIV (1949), 52-53.

[27] A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 16.

[28] "Note on the New Edition of Professor Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*," *Mind*, LVII (Oct., 1948), 418.

[29] *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 15.

[30] *Ibid.*, p. 16.

[31] *Ibid.*

himself hedges more and more. He tells us, you recall, that a statement is factually meaningful (nonanalytic), if, and only if, it is either directly or indirectly verifiable. But this becomes shortly, "Unless it [a factual statement] satisfied the principle of verification, it would not be capable of being understood in the sense in which either scientific or common-sense statements are habitually understood."[27] All that this means, however, is that unless a statement has the sort of verification a scientific or common-sense statement has, it will not be a scientific or common-sense statement. Thus John Wisdom amusingly writes that by an analysis of the verification principle we arrive at its complementary platitude, that "every sort of statement has its own sort of meaning."[28]

Indeed, on Ayer's own admission, this supposedly self-evident criterion of meaning is not all it seemed to be. To quote Professor Ayer:

> In putting forward the principle of verification as a criterion of meaning, I do not overlook the fact that the word "meaning" is commonly used in a variety of senses, and I do not wish to deny that in some of these senses a statement may properly be said to be meaningful even though it is neither analytic nor empirically verifiable.[29]

And again:

> It is indeed open to anyone to adopt a different criterion of meaning and so to produce an alternative definition which may very well correspond to one of the ways in which the word "meaning" is commonly used. And if a statement satisfied such a criterion, there is, no doubt, some proper use of the word "understanding" in which it would be capable of being understood.[30]

The verification principle, consequently, is quite incapable of eliminating metaphysics or anything else. And for this we have Ayer's own testimony:

> . . . although I should still like to defend the use of the criterion of verifiability as a methodological principle, I realize that for the effective elimination of metaphysics it needs to be supported by detailed analyses of particular metaphysical arguments.[31]

A frank and honest admission, to be sure.

Though difficulties with the verification principle have multiplied, many positivists, including Hempel, Frank, Stace, Feigl and Church, believe satisfactory solutions may still be reached by a systematic use of the logistic method. We ask the further question, then, whether, on positivist principles, a justification of this principle as a criterion of meaning is at all possible. Now, the positivist might offer either a-priori or empirical reasons to establish his position. But he is barred from giving any a-priori reason because, on his own saying, the a priori is a free creation of the human mind incapable of justifying any theory whatsoever. And he cannot even attempt to offer empirical reasons, since an empirical inspection of *meaning* is a logical impossibility contradicting the very notion of "verifiability in principle." If the verification principle cannot be justified in either of these two ways, it must be considered a purely arbitrary assumption.

To this line of reasoning the positivist might reply that his criterion is indeed arbitrary. He would explain that the criterion is an arbitrary convention about what *he* understands by *meaning* which, as such, required no justification. Very well. But if this is his stand, as Ewing remarks, the positivist is excused from having to prove his theory "only at the expense of admitting that there is no more reason for accepting it than there is for accepting any theory whatever."[32]

No, answers Professor Ayer, the verification principle is not supposed to be "entirely arbitrary" because unless a statement satisfied this criterion of meaning, it could not be understood as scientific and common-sense statements are.[33] But all that this means, as pointed out previously, is that unless a statement has the kind of verification a scientific or common-sense statement has, it will not be a scientific or common-sense statement. Granted, I say, but we are now a long way from the positivist's original announcement of the verification principle as *the* criterion of meaning, a universal criterion, capable of eliminating all metaphysics and of solving all outstanding philosophical disputes.

There is a more fundamental reason, however, which closes all avenues of justification to the positivist. From the start, positivism limits true knowledge (nonanalytic) to the correlation of observational data. The human knower cannot rise above the level of sensation. By

[32]"Meaninglessness," *Mind*, XLV, 351.
[33]*Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 16.
[34]*Ibid.*

what possible means, then, can the validity of sense knowledge be established? Sensation, by nature, does not carry with it its own justification. Because the senses are limited and conditioned by matter, with sense knowledge alone man could never make a complete retour and reflect back on the nature and validity of his act and faculty of sense. On his premises, the positivist can never hope to give a rational account of his theory.

More fundamentally still, the positivist can find no justification of the verification principle without appealing to metaphysics—and that a metaphysics of empiricism. To assert that the only true knowledge is reducible to sense is implicitly to assert that the only real is the sensible. This metaphysical assertion the positivist cannot and never attempts to prove. It is his initial act of faith.

Another more embarrassing difficulty, closely connected with justification, concerns the very meaning of the verification principle. On positivist principles, the test of a significant statement is that it be either analytic or empirically verifiable. Is the verification principle analytic? It hardly seems so, since the analytic says nothing at all about reality, and this principle certainly proposes to say a great deal about reality. Is it then an empirical hypothesis? But how is *meaning* capable, even in principle, of empirical observation? If it is neither an analytic nor an empirical hypothesis, the consistent positivist should reject his criterion of meaning as meaningless and hence self-defeating.

To this Professor Ayer has replied that the verification principle should be regarded as a definition, as a methodological principle of analytic character.[84] Now, according to the positivist, an analytic statement is freely and arbitrarily made. Even if the verification principle be granted meaning, then, it can only be a free and arbitrary assumption. Ayer's remark about the principle not being "entirely arbitrary" we have already considered. Future attempts to formulate a verification principle, even should they be successful to the extent of eliminating the logical difficulties, will all necessarily labor under this basic difficulty of justification.

This failure of positivism to provide anything but an arbitrary foundation for the verification principle would seem the underlying

reason for recent positivist concern with metaphysics, understood in a broad sense.[35] Other factors also are responsible for the new positivist accent on "first philosophy." First, there appears a growing awareness among analysts that existential propositions possess, after all, a unique character which defies purely verbal analysis and which, consequently, can be handled only by a science of the real.[36] Secondly, the original positivist attitude of regarding propositions as independent entities is gradually broadening to admit a consideration of the mental act of judgment which finds expression in a proposition. In any case, though positivists have not formally embraced a metaphysic, they have at least tempered their denunciations of that science and are cautiously and slowly weighing its value and place.

A third factor, and a strong extrinsic impetus to positivists' second look at metaphysics, is the amount of criticism provoked by the emotive theory of values. Ethical judgments, according to positivists, do not state anything at all factual, but merely express a speaker's feelings and, as such, cannot be said to be either true or false. If, then, values are without reality, morals are without meaning. This can be the only conclusion for the consistent positivist—in destroying metaphysics, he necessarily destroys ethics. For if there is no meaning in things, at least none that "philosophy" can discover, then it is impossible to assign a finis to human existence; if the world that we know by our senses is the only real one, then questions concerning the nature and end of man simply cannot be discussed. Notions of God, immortality, and freedom are metaphysical and, consequently, meaningless.

In his most recent collection of essays, Professor Ayer avows the emotive theory of values as explained above to be an over-simplification. He qualifies in many ways his former statements and takes pains to deny that morals are trivial or unimportant,[37] that nothing is good or bad, right or wrong,[38] and that anything anybody thinks right *is* right.[39] With regard to freedom of the will, furthermore, Ayer will not assert that it is a mere illusion, for "to say that my behavior can be predicted is not to say that I am acting under constraint."[40]

[35]Gustav Bergman, *The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism* (New York, 1954).

[36]A. J. Ayer, *Philosophical Essays* (New York, 1954), pp. 215-30.

[37]*Ibid.*, p. 238.

[38]*Ibid.*, p. 245.

[39]*Ibid.*, p. 246.

[40]*Ibid.*, p. 284.

Thus while Ayer and positivists write on, one thing becomes apparent: the unqualified positivism of a decade ago is no more.

In summary, positivism has brought down more difficulties upon its head than the number of philosophical disputes it proposed to solve. It finds itself incapable of justifying its own tenets. It destroys metaphysics only by a metaphysics, thereby destroying itself. Even the very formulation of the verification principle as a criterion of meaning proves to be either too inclusive, allowing factual import to any statement whatsoever, or too exclusive, denying meaning to obviously meaningful statements and even to scientific hypotheses. And the implications of the verification criterion in the field of ethics are only too apparent to positivists themselves. If this most distinctive and most essential principle of logical positivism proves useless, positivism, as a philosophy of the real, can only die of frustration.

The Metaphysical Society of America held its seventh annual meeting, March 23 and 24, 1956, at Fordham University. The meeting opened with a panel discussion of the relation of metaphysics to theology. The Reverend George P. Klubertanz, s.j., of Saint Louis University, in the opening paper, considered metaphysics as an autonomous philosophy of being, which yet historically profited from philosophically significant data of the Christian revelation. He also indicated that scientific theology used metaphysics as an instrument. Professor Raphael Demos of Harvard University maintained that there could be no ethics without religion, for religion to him is that part of human experience that is concerned with values and finality. Professor Paul Tillich of Harvard University maintained that metaphysics and theology are coextensive approaches to one and the same ultimate reality; metaphysics grows out of the same existential roots that theology views as the manifestation of God. The commentator, Professor Henry B. Veatch, of Indiana University, pointed the discussion to the differing views on the nature of both metaphysics and theology held by the panelists.

The presidential address of Professor Newton B. Stallknecht, of Indiana University, was entitled "The Quality of Man" and concerned itself with total responsibility; the commentator, Professor John Wild, of Harvard University, questioned the absolute value of commitment in itself, pointing out that there was an objective good to which the commitment ought to be made.

Shorter papers were given by George B. Burch (Tufts University), "The Problem of Universals in Philosophy of Education" (commentator, H. S. Broudy); Robert S. Brumbaugh (Yale University), "Metaphysical Systems and the Problem of Transformation" (commentator, George K. Plochmann); Beatrice and Sydney Rome (Rand Corporation), "Some Speculations on Intentionally Structured Systems" (commentator, William A. Gerhard); Andrew P. Ushenko (Indiana University), "The Form of Meaning and Being" (commentator, Irwin C. Lieb); I. M. Bochenski, o.p. (University of Notre Dame), "The Problem of Universals" (commentator, William Walton).

At the annual business meeting, the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, s.j., was elected president, Professor Henry B. Veatch secretary, and Professor Richard McKeon councillor. After Professor Veatch's resignation, Doctor Sydney Rome was appointed secretary.

THE FREEDOM OF MAN IN PLOTINUS

Mr. John R. Crocker, s.j. *received his M. A. from Loyola University (Chicago). He is now teaching at St. Ignatius High School (Cleveland).*

The following article is a textual analysis of the *Enneads* of Plotinus to determine whether Plotinus held man to be free and what he understands this freedom to be. My primary sources are Emile Brehier's *Plotin: Enneades* (6 vols. Paris, 1924), Stephen Mackenna's *Plotinus* (2 vols. Boston, 1916), and Grace H. Turnbull's *The Essence of Plotinus* (New York, 1948). My secondary sources are A. H. Armstrong's *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1940), William Ralph Inge's *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (2 vols. New York, 1929), and Philip V. Pistorius's *Plotinus and Neoplatonism* (Cambridge, 1952).

The philosophy of Plotinus is one of emanation and return. The emanation of the world is effected through the three Hypostases. The first of these is the One, also called the Good (*to En, to Agathon*). This is the supreme principle, the beginning and end of all being. Proceeding from the One is Mind (*Nous*), its first effect, which then knows the One. Mind comprehends in itself all intelligible forms of lower reality. The last Hypostasis is Soul (*Psychē*), the principle of activity, proceeding from the One and from Mind.

All other reality thus emanated seeks to be reabsorbed in the One as all effects desire (*ephietai*) the Good.[1] To understand Plotinus's conception of man's free acts and will, it will be necessary to know something more of soul and its nature in man, as well as of Plotinus's understanding of desire, virtue, and the various interpretations of freedom.

It has been said that Soul is the third Hypostasis. This Soul can be considered in various ways. First, it is the World Soul (*psychē tou pantos*) which contains in itself all the germinal principles of life.

Particular souls (*hekastou*)[2] emanate from this World Soul. These particular souls are either those of animals, immersed in matter, or of men. In man, the particular soul is compounded of a higher part which desires (*orexis* or *ephesis*) the World Soul, and through this, Mind, leading to the One; and the lower part which has an affinity (*epithymia*) for matter, is mixed with it and makes possible sensation, appetite, and passion.[3]

Man, then, appears to be between the world of spirit and the world of matter. One author has put this mediate position of man in this way:

> The individual, and particularly the human soul, seems for Plotinus to occupy an intermediate place between the lower and higher, or rather to contain both lower and higher in it . . . Individual souls never simply exist in and for the material world, are not completely bound up with it, though they are not as completely detached from the material world as the higher and universal soul.[4]

Man has, then, a complex soul. In its lower part there is no possibility of freedom since it is bound to a body and is moved by external circumstances, passions, and the senses.[5] The higher part, however, presents another picture. The soul, or at least some part of it, must of itself be free (*eleutheron*) because it is turned to Mind, which is itself free since it resides in the Good and is dominated by virtue which is also free.[6] Therefore, the Good emanating through all spiritual being releases the higher part of man, soul, from the complete bondage of matter. Dean Inge has—with emendation, since he tends to interpret Plotinus in too idealistic a context—well expressed what is here stated.

> What is free in us is that spontaneous movement of the Spirit

[1] *Enneads*, III, 2, 3.

[2] In this paper when the reference is definitely to the Hypostases the word will be capitalized, otherwise the lower case will be retained.

[3] *Enneads*, III, i, 7, 8; *ibid.*, 2, 3; IV, 8, 13, *passim*.

[4] A. H. Armstrong, *The Architecture of the Intelligible Universe in the Philosophy of Plotinus* (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 90-91 (Selection cited from the *Enneads* is IV, 3, 12-18).

[5] *Enneads*, III, 1, 8.

[6] *Ibid.*, VI, 8, 6.

[7] William Ralph Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (New York, 1929), II, 132-34.

[8] *Enneads*, VI, 8, 1.

[9] *Ibid.*, III, 3, 4.

[10] *Ibid.*, 2, 4.

[11] *Ibid.*, VI, 8, 2 (literally, "reasoning with appetite").

which has no external cause . . . it is the will of the higher Soul to return to its own principle. The element of freedom in our practical activities is this underlying motive, the spiritual activity of the Soul. When the Soul becomes Spirit (Mind), its will is free, the good will (*boulēsis*), in attaining its desire, becomes spiritual perception (*noēsis*), and Spirit is free in its own right.[7]

Empirical investigation also reveals man's possibility of self-domination. Sudden action, necessity, or passion often compel man to act. This presents a contrast for other acts which he foresees and can refuse to posit.[8] Men are praised or blamed for certain actions, and it seems that they must in some way be responsible for them.[9] Nor do we ever see a happy man who has not earned his happiness by his actions.[10] It is clear, then, from Plotinus's own words indicated in the above loci that man has in his very nature the ability to posit free acts. But before this can be fully grasped, it is necessary to investigate and determine the meaning Plotinus assigns to certain terms.

In the foregoing analysis the term "desire" was used in a wide sense. To understand its place in Plotinus's doctrine of will, the various distinctions he gives it must be explained. There are in general three kinds of desire or appetite in Plotinus. The first, *hormē,* which he uses in a general sense for any natural inclination, enters little into the doctrine of will and can be dispensed with in this study. The second kind of desire is for an action, *orexis.* The third is *ephesis,* which he uses only in reference to the desire all beings have for the Good or Mind. Of these *orexis* enters most prominently into his doctrine of will.

A threefold division of *orexis,* or the desire for action, is given: *thymos,* the irascible desire; *epithymia,* the concupiscible; and *logismos met' orexeos,* the rational. This last occurs frequently in this discussion and will be translated as "rational desire."[11]

Plotinus's understanding of virtue also plays an important role in the doctrine of will. Virtue cannot be counted among the lower passions (*pathēmata*), nor is it governed by reason (*logos*). It is the action of mind (*nous*) itself or the quality of an act conformed to mind. Since mind is supreme and subordinate to nothing, so must

virtue be. It has as its purpose to moderate the passions and desires (*orexeis*). The urge to effect this order and goodness in the soul arises, of itself, in mind as a free impulse subordinate to nothing.[12]

No matter what term is used for freedom—*eleutheron*,[13] *to eph' hēmin*, *autexousion*[14]—it is clear that every virtuous act must be free. In fact, virtue is itself freedom. Inge again confirms this opinion when he says, "Virtue is not so much free as identical with freedom; it is the unobstructed activity of the higher soul."[15] It will become clear below that, if virtue is free (*eleuthera*), it must also be self-disposed, independent, and deliberate. But first these terms require definition.

A defect that mars many commentaries and translations of Plotinus is their failure carefully to separate these terms, translating them indiscriminately as "freedom," "will," "willed," or "self mastery." To avoid this confusion the purpose here is briefly to define and indicate the translations to be employed in this paper.

The term which occurs most frequently is *to eph' hēmin*, in another form *kyrioi praxai*.[16] Plotinus is careful to describe it as the ability to act not as slaves to fate or to necessity or to strength of passion but only out of our own independent desire (*orexis*)—to so act with nothing impeding our wishes.[17] The most apt translation seems to be "self-disposed."[18]

The next word to be considered is *autexousion*, translated "independence,"[19] the second most frequently used word in Plotinus's doctrine of will. Plotinus applies this word to movement and to the choice of the deity to come and put order into the world. It also refers to the power and sovereignty of the deity.

Hekousion[20] and its contrary *akousion*[21] follow. When the soul acts under external force, or is compelled to seek nongood rather than the good, its action is *akousion*. But when the soul acts under the influence of pure mind and is self-disposed, then it is *hekousion*.

[12] *Ibid.*, 5 and 6.
[13] *Ibid.*, 5.
[14] *Ibid.*, 6.
[15] *Philosophy of Plotinus*, II, 185.
[16] *Enneads*, VI, 8, 3-6.
[17] "[Ὡ]ς τούτου ἐσομένου ἂν ἐφ' ἡμῖν, ὃ μὴ τύχαις δουλεύοντες μηδὲ ἀνάγκαις μηδὲ πάθεσιν ἰσκυροῖς πράξαιμεν ἂν βουληθέντες οὐδενὸς ἐναντιουμένου ταῖς βουλήσεσιν" (*ibid.*, 1, ll. 27-30).
[18] This translation is taken from Grace H. Turnbull, *The Essence of Plotinus* (New York, 1948).
[19] *Enneads*, III, 2, 4; IV, 8, 5; VI, 8, 3-6 and 20.
[20] *Ibid.*, III, 1, 9; VI, 8, 1, 4.
[21] *Ibid.*, VI, 8, 1 and 3-4.
[22] *Ibid.*, III, 3, 4; VI, 8, 3-4, 6-7, and 12.
[23] *Ibid.*, VI, 8, 1, 3, and 5-6.
[24] *Ibid.*, II, 3, 14-15 and 19; III, 3, 3 and 4, 5; IV, 3, 12; 4, 31, 35; 7, 5.

The amount of knowledge present in the agent, or the lack of it, can also determine whether an act is *hekousion* or *akousion.* Insofar as the agent is conscious of what he is doing, the act is *hekousion;* but insofar as he is ignorant of what he is doing, the act is *akousion.* This knowledge can be of general laws or of particular circumstances. We will translate these terms as "deliberate" or "indeliberate."

Perhaps the most common word used by the Greeks to express the concept of freedom is *eleutheron.* Plotinus, too, employs this word and closely connects it with those so far considered.[22] All these other four terms, however, apply properly only to the act, whereas *eleutheron* denotes more frequently a state or a principle, though it can also refer to the act; that is, the Good, Soul, Mind, virtue. A being neither acting for another nor in any way depending upon another is *eleutheron,* in contrast to a person enslaved by his lower nature. In this restricted sense the term *eleutheron* will be used to describe such a being, act, or state as "free."

This leads to the further consideration of what Plotinus understands this "free" principle to be. He calls it *boulēsis*[23] or "will." This is the ability to posit unimpeded or self-disposed action, immaterial, without need. The will resides in reason, or, as will be explained shortly, is a thought (*noēsis*) conformed to mind. Other words connected with will are *boulomai,* its root, and *ethelo* or *thelo,* "to wish," often used to signify the particular action of the will. In this last sense "to will" refers most properly to the desire for the Good.

That act which is considered characteristic of the will, and to which must be applied self-disposal, independence, deliberateness, and freedom, is *proaeresis.*[24] This pertains not to body but to the soul, mind, and will. It is used in reference to various acts; those by which man is partial cause of his own destiny, marriage, the acts of the stars (*sic*), the act of Him who proportions all things. This particular act is what Plotinus means by free choice and will be translated as the "act of choice."

After this somewhat tedious exposition of terms, the problem facing this study is now apparent. From his plethora of terms it is not difficult to see or establish that Plotinus held free will, liberty, and free choice in man. But what he meant by these terms is another

problem. It is evident that he intends all these terms to refer to virtue, mind, and soul, as well as to Mind and Soul, and somehow to depend on them. First the nature of this act must be discovered, using the act-to-principle technique, and secondly the nature of the principle of this act.

The word most often applied to the act under consideration is "self-disposal" (*to eph' hēmin*). This word is a more generic term, and any other word used for freedom can be considered a more properly contracted species of *to eph' hēmin*. Consequently, whatever can be said of *to eph' hēmin* can be said of its inferiors.

Self-disposal for Plotinus is that characteristic of a man's act that opposes it to enslavement by fate, necessity, strength of passion, force, or his own lower nature. It is unimpeded self-movement.[25]

This self-movement, or self-disposal, cannot be the activity of the imagination since it must then be attributed to beasts, infants, and the depraved, and Plotinus considers it characteristically human.[26] Nor can self-disposal characterize external practical action (*praxis*) as such, since for Plotinus an external action is always ordered to an end other than itself, that of the universe, and must therefore be externally necessitated.[27] Self-disposal, then, since it is self-movement and free, cannot be necessitated; nor for this same reason can it be an external action. Self-disposal must, then, be an internal act of man which is an act of knowledge. Nor can this be sense knowledge, since mere sense knowledge of an act never made anyone self-disposed originator of that act. If it did, even beasts would have self-disposal, since they too have sense knowledge of their acts.[28] The conclusion is, then, that self-disposal depends on intellectual knowledge.

But even intellectual knowledge[29] cannot of itself cause an action (*tēn praxin agei*). Therefore, since self-disposal causes activity, de-

[25] *Ibid.*, VI, 8, 4.
[26] *Ibid.*, 2-3.
[27] *Ibid.*, 2 and 4-6.
[28] *Ibid.*, 2.
[29] At this point various terms connected with intellection in Plotinus must be distinguished. *Logos* (III, 4, 2; IV, 3, 23) is the principle of reasoning; *logismos* (VI, 8, 1) is a noun meaning the operation of the reason; *nous* (VI, 2, 20, 22; VI, 8, 13) is the seat of knowledge, perfect in itself; *noēsis* (I, 1, 1; II, 3, 17; III, 1, 3) is used to express conceptualization; *gnomē* (II, 1, 6; III, 2, 8; IV, 3, 7) is a judgment; and *theōria* (III, 8, 3; 9, 1; V, 3, 5) means contemplation.
[30] *Ibid.*, VI, 8, 2.
[31] *Ibid.*, 2-3.
[32] *Ibid.*, 5.
[33] *Ibid.*
[34] *Ibid.*
[35] *Ibid.*, 3.
[36] *Ibid.*, 5.

sire (*orexis*) must become part of it, since only desire moves to action. The desire in question can neither be the irascible nor the concupiscible appetites, since even beasts have these.[30] The only desire remaining is the rational (*logismos met' orexeos*), and this is proper to self-disposal.

Not any intellectual desire, however, will cause the activity of which there is question, but only right desire and right reasoning (*to ortho logismo kai tē orthē orexei*).[31] Therefore, from the analysis of the terms used, self-disposal includes these elements—reasoning and right desire, with a view to, and preceding, practical action.

It is well to analyze this same act of a man from another point of view. The nature of virtue has been considered. Simply stated, virtue is free (self-disposed, independent, deliberate in every way). Therefore, a person practicing virtue conformable to mind must *eo ipso* be free and self-disposed.[32] The meaning of self-disposal can then be reduced to a soul practicing virtue in conformity with mind, and again it is clear that self-disposal must be in the mind. Plotinus summarizes these conclusions.

> If virtue, then, is somehow a kind of second mind (*nous*), and a habit causing the soul to become that mind . . . in the practical action itself there is no self-disposal, but only in the mind (*no*) free from the practical action itself (*ton praxeon*)[33].

A question arises concerning the precise object of the prepractical contemplation. Simply, it is the practical action to be done (due to the rational desire) in the light of virtue, which is the soul contemplating the Good through Mind. But this will become clearer below.

Another characteristic of man's act is introduced by Plotinus in his understanding of independence (*autexousion*). All that can be said of self-disposal must equally be said of independence, and the two are very frequently linked.[34] An act can neither be self-disposed nor independent if it proceeds with ignorance of what is right or is led by chance, imagination, or the passions of the body.[35] Both self-disposal and independence are reduced to the internal activity of reasoning antecedent to the external act, and to that which depends on virtue.[36] The question must now arise concerning a distinction between these

two terms used by Plotinus to refer to the same action. The solution will be found, perhaps, in the solution to two other problems raised by Plotinus.

In *Ennead* VI, 8, 2, Plotinus considers the relationship between reasoning or discourse (*logismos*) and desire (*orexis*). He seems, then, to understand some distinction between them. His problem here is one of causality. If the desire arises from the composite (man), then the desire must obey natural necessity, since the body is in the external world of necessity and self-disposal cannot be found in such an act. If the desire, on the other hand, arises only from the soul, then not all the acts we commonly refer to as self-disposed are really such, since it is the composite man who acts. A third possibility presents itself if the reasoning is entirely independent of the desire; but then how can the desire ever arise at all? Therefore, somehow the two must be independent yet somehow connected.

The following analysis is an attempt to solve this problem as well as to find some distinction between self-disposal and independence. Plotinus, it has been seen, considers all external actions necessitated.[37] But he states explicitly that since neither self-disposal nor independence is reducible to external action, they cannot be necessitated.

> Consequently, even the independence and the self-disposal found in practical actions is not reducible to the fact of acting nor to the external activity but to the internal activity, namely, thought and the contemplation of virtue itself.[38]

Thought is certainly free, and virtue, or a being contemplating virtue, is the same.[39]

From this citation and a general understanding of Plotinus's doctrine so far considered, it may be concluded that though the external act as such is not free, the internal activity of mind preceding that act is free. But this internal activity of mind preceding that act has a twofold note. It is thought, contemplation, or reasoning (*logismos*); but if it is to issue into any external actions it must somehow include desire (*orexis*).

[37] *Ibid.*

[38] "... ὥστε καὶ τὸ ἐν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτεξούσιον καὶ τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ πράττειν ἀνάγεσθαι οὐδ' εἰς τὴν ἔξω, ἀλλ' εἰς τήν ἐντος ἐνέργειαν καὶ νόησιν καὶ θεωρίαν αὐτῆς τῆς ἀρετῆς" (*ibid.*, 6, ll. 19-22).

[39] *Ibid.*, 5-6.

[40] *Architecture of the Intelligible Universe*, pp. 100-1.

In this distinction, then, the difficulty raised in *Enneads* VI, 8, 2 may be solved. The reasoning is free because of its connection with mind and soul, both of which must be free. The desire, then, does not arise from the composite but is consequent upon this reasoning. Although it arises only from the soul, then, the act is still self-disposed and independent. But—and this must be stressed—there are two actions under consideration: the first, internal, rational desire, which is self-disposed and independent, properly, as will appear, the act of choice; the second, external, directed, posited, and caused by the first. The second act is of the composite, external and therefore necessary but proceeding from, and caused by, the internal, which is self-disposed, independent, and free. The desire, then, arising from this reasoning depends on reasoning; and since reasoning is free, the desire is also free.

But this distinction solves as well the problem of Plotinus's use of self-disposal and independence. Properly, the *to eph' hēmin* refers to the reasoning, while the *autexousion* refers to the desire. In this way Plotinus brings out the distinction between the two principles (if such they can be called) of this composite act of choice preceding practical actions.

This problem of the connection between internal freedom and external necessity can also be considered from a moral or ethical point of view. Professor A. H. Armstrong states the question well.

> It is the old difficulty of which Plotinus is fully conscious, which arises whenever he tries to reconcile the moral responsibility of the individual soul for its own destiny with the universal all-embracing order. . . . It must be remembered, however, that for Plotinus man is a 'bridge-being', intermediate between the two worlds.[40]

If these two worlds are understood as those of necessity versus freedom, of spirit versus matter, of soul, mind, and good versus body, the problem is solved. Man is partly in this world of matter, body, and necessity in which there is no freedom. Man also, however, partakes of that other higher, free, and self-disposed world of reason and independent desire arising from this reasoning; and his acts in this

world are anterior to those of his necessitated physical and material nature. Man is, therefore, free before positing external acts. The reasoning and desire are self-disposed and independent. However, once man has freely decided to act and the act is posited in the external material world of body, it is necessary. But it must be kept in mind that it was man, choosing what he thought best in the light of the Good, that determined what this act should be.

If it is asked further why man's choice always conforms to the order of the external world decreed by the One, Plotinus would probably reply:

> Mind has a principle different from itself, but not outside itself since it is in the Good. To say, then, that it is conformed to the Good makes its self-disposal and freedom all the greater, since freedom (*eleutheron*) and self-disposal are sought for the sake of the Good. If that being strives for the Good, it is all the more self-disposed, since it tends to the Good by its own self-disposition, because it is turned to that which is best for itself.[41]

To resume again the analysis of this act of man, all that has been said of self-disposal and independence also applies to the act as deliberate (*hekousion*). A deliberate action is one in accord with, and depending upon, self-disposal and free from external force. Plotinus says that the two are often confused but really are different and separable. An action can be self-disposed and still be either deliberate or indeliberate.[42] Self-disposal depends on reason to be such, but deliberate or indeliberate in an act requires actual knowledge of particular circumstances or general laws. For example, because of his rational desire a man is independent and can dispose himself to kill another man. Now this act, though self-disposed and independent, can be indeliberate if he is ignorant of the universal prohibition against homicide. Or it can be deliberate in the sense that he knows

[41] *Enneads*, VI, 8, 4.

[42] This obviously is not the case with self-disposal and independence. If an act is independent it must be self-disposed and, if applied to the actions of man, a composite, also vice versa.

[43] *Enneads*, VI, 8, 1. An indeliberate act done out of ignorance can still be self-disposed but not if done under force or passion.

[44] *Ibid.*, 8, 3-4.

[45] *Ibid.*, 6-7.

[46] *Ibid.*, 4 and 6.

[47] *Ibid.*, 6.

[48] *Ibid.*, III, 3, 4.

[49] *Ibid.*, VI, 8, 12.

[50] *Ibid.*, 5.

[51] *Ibid.*, 2.

[52] *Ibid.*, III, 3, 4.

[53] *Ibid.*, VI, 8, 4.

it is wrong to kill another, but indeliberate if he does not know that other man is his friend. An act, then, can be deliberate or indeliberate in general, or mixed, depending upon the knowledge present in a particular circumstance.[43]

Man, then, places an act of which he is the master; that is, to which he disposes himself. This act has a double content. It depends upon reason or mind, which stems from the Soul, Mind, and Good and gives it this self-mastery. But it depends also upon desire of an external action which it proposes to itself. In this sense it is independent. This self-disposed independence can be deliberate or indeliberate depending upon the particular knowledge of universal laws or circumstances in a given situation. This whole act, in all its various aspects, Plotinus further denotes as free (*eleutheron*).

A free act is also self-disposed, independent, and deliberate. Self-disposal, however, is practically always used to apply to an action, while freedom is mostly used in reference to a static state or principle, although it is also annexed to the act proceeding from such a principle. This static state is a person or being,[44] soul,[45] mind, and virtue,[46] immaterial being (*aulon*),[47] principle (*archē*),[48] or essence (*ousia*),[49] and also describes an intrinsic note of willing and choosing (*helomenos*).[50]

If a distinction is required between freedom on the one hand and self-disposal, independence, and deliberateness, on the other, it can be said that while these latter refer to the action itself, freedom refers to an action as dependent upon, and proceeding from, a principle which is itself free. Freedom, then, as distinct from these other terms, connotes a relationship and directs attention to the principle of the act.

Plotinus calls this principle the will (*boulēsis*). He asks to what part (*eis hēmas*) of ourselves we must attribute self-disposal.[51] Having said that man possesses a free principle (*eleutheran archēn*) which distinguishes him from beasts,[52] he identifies this principle with the will.[53]

He next asks: How reduce self-disposal to the will? Mind, virtue, and soul are free (*eleutheroi*), as well as the activities to which they dispose themselves. Since self-disposal is impossible without freedom and since freedom is a spiritual entity, self-disposal must also be

reduced to a spiritual entity. Whatever proceeds from this spiritual principle is self-disposed, and whatever it wishes and accomplishes without obstacle is the same.[54]

But the will itself is this spiritual or nonmaterial entity. It imitates a being conformed to Mind, and Mind is in the Good. So the will wills the Good, and mind contains whatever the will wills. Further, it must be noted that what approaches mind can only be soul. The conclusion is necessarily, therefore, that the will is the soul becoming thought (*noēsis*) in contemplation of the Good.[55] Professor Inge has put this well: "In the world of soul it [the will] is the proper life and activity in which the Soul expresses itself."[56] In brief, since Plotinus admits the doctrine of powers (*dynameis*),[57] the will might be defined as the particular power of the soul to become thought. By reason of this affinity with soul and mind, the will is free to dispose itself to posit a free, independent, and deliberate or indeliberate act, which is a free choice (*proaeresis*). The result of this choice is an external action (*praxis*).

This act of choice is an act preceding the actual external action. It can be understood in two ways. In general, all animals have some choice consequent upon their concupiscible desires and appetites. But since the animal can only make certain choices whose end is outside the agent and necessarily conformed to the end of the universe, these choices are externally necessitated. In a stricter sense this act is called by Plotinus right choice (*orthē proaeresis*). This choice, whose actuating desire is *orexis*, seeks the Good and is superior to passion.[58]

Plotinus explicitly applies this act to the soul;[59] and in another form of the same word, *helomenos*, he refers it to a being disposed for the Good and links it with sovereignty due to virtue alone. In this sense it proceeds from the will.[60] From these descriptions it is clear that the act of choice must be free.

Etymologically examined, the word *proaeresis* means an act preceding another act. If *haereo* means a seizing, doing, or accomplishing, then the *pro-aereo* is a seizing, doing, or accomplishing *before*—that is, the choice to perform some particular act previous to the act itself.

[54] *Ibid.*, 6.
[55] *Ibid.*
[56] *Philosophy of Plotinus*, I, 253.
[57] *Enneads*, IV, 4, 35.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] *Ibid.*, III, 4, 5.
[60] *Ibid.*, VI, 8, 5.
[61] *Ibid.*, II, 3, 9.

The act of choice, then, proceeding from free will, is free, self-disposed, independent, and deliberate.

It is clear, in conclusion, that in Plotinus's doctrine there is place for a free will and free choice in man because of the freedom of man's higher soul. Man is a free being for whom "there is another emancipated life. . . . It is in this paradise that the soul lives united in contemplation with the divine and the beautiful."[61]

Grotius on the Law of War

DONALD CLARK HODGES, *University of Missouri*

The right to peace represents one of the most fundamental of human needs—the need for security and the preservation of human life.[1] The greatest threat to human life, health, and security is the use of physical violence; the least productive condition of mankind, a permanent state of war. As the first obligation of justice, as traditionally conceived, is to do no man injury,[2] the foremost right of man is peace or resistance to war. Life or being is a condition of the enjoyment of other rights. Peace may be the price of tyranny and slavery, but the price of war is death and destruction of the material conditions of happiness. Without peace there can be no fraternity; without fraternity there is the risk of losing both liberty and equality. The right of fraternity and therefore of peace is a condition of social order, as war is a condition of barbarism and anarchy.[3]

There are two ways of disputing in the world, the one by reason and the other by open force; but, as the latter is more becoming to brutes than to human beings, it should be used only against those who have disturbed

[1]This paper was read at the first annual meeting of the Central Renaissance Conference, University of Missouri, May 14, 1955.

[2]Cicero *Offices* i. 7, trans. Thomas Cockman (*Offices, Essays, & Letters,* [London: Dent, 1949]).

[3]Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Part I, Chap. 13.

[4]Cicero *Offices* i. 11, trans. Cockman.

[5]*The City of God,* Book 19, Chap. 12, trans. and ed. Marcus Dods (Edinburgh, 1892).

[6]Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis,* ed. James Brown Scott (2 vols. Oxford, 1925), Vol. II, *Prolegomena* (trans. F. W. Kelsey et al.); Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Part I, Chap. 14.

[7]Hobbes, *Leviathan,* Part I, Chap. 13.

[8]*De Jure Belli ac Pacis,* Book I, Chap. 1, sec. 11.

[9]*Summa Theologiae,* II-II, qq. 37-42, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (22 vols. London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1929), Vol. 9.

[10]The idea of a law of nations is ambiguous. Although it is a literal translation of the Roman *jus gentium,* its original meaning was different from that of either St. Thomas or Grotius. It originally consisted of a set of rules, imbued with the principles of fairness and equity, for regulating litigations between non-Romans, and between foreigners and Roman citizens. Gradually these rules were extended to litigations between Romans. The Roman law of nations was originally a system of private law governing the relations between individuals of different nationalities. In the course of time it was extended to include the rules and legal institutions,

the peace, and only as a last measure for restoring it.[4] Without the external peace of the City of Man, according to St. Augustine, there is little opportunity to cultivate moral virtue and enjoy peace of mind: "Whoever gives even moderate attention to human affairs and to our common nature, will recognize that if there is no man who does not wish to be joyful, neither is there anyone who does not wish to have peace."[5] Both Grotius and Hobbes subscribed to this right in preference to other rights.[6] In periods of relative peace, the importance of this right has frequently been underestimated; but during the breakup of the Roman Empire and the period of religious wars in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries, peace was ranked of first importance to man. In our own day, with two world wars behind us and the development of man's powers to destroy entire areas of the globe, the right to peace or security and the need for fraternity are, once again, being given the consideration due them.

The classic work on the right to peace is Grotius's major work, *The Law of War and Peace.* War, according to Grotius, is the abomination of desolation. As much as any other man, he would have subscribed to Hobbes's classic indictment of war:

> In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving, and removing, such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.[7]

War, as defined by Grotius, is a state of strife or contention between opposing parties.[8] It includes acts of fraud as well as violence; private as well as public strife. Unlike St. Thomas, for whom war implied the use of violence,[9] for Grotius it is a general term for all vices opposed to peace, in thought and word as well as deed.

In arguing for the existence of a law of war, Grotius's intent was to circumscribe the boundaries of the more destructive kinds of war. Such wars are primarily national, although civil war and the state of war by which the criminal puts himself in opposition to society are also destructive of life and property. As there are many who view international law or the law of nations[10] with contempt, Grotius felt called upon to vindicate it against the charges that might makes right and that the administration of a state is independent of justice. The alternative to cynicism was sought in a right to war, as well as peace, founded not upon the will or consent of nations but upon human reason.

For the rational basis of war, Grotius turned to arguments from the classics and the Scriptures. The intrinsic merit of Grotius's contributions to the law of war rests largely upon his acceptance of the Scholastic tradition. His painstaking analysis of problems, his rigorous insistence upon distinctions, as well as respect for current fact and tradition, suggest the method of St. Thomas. When the Schoolmen agree on a point of morals, according to Grotius, it rarely happens that they are wrong. In respect for the tradition of Biblical and classical scholarship, and for the authority of the Church, Grotius writes thus at the close of his *Prolegomena*: "And now if anything has here been said by me inconsistent with piety, with good morals, with Holy Writ, with the concord of the Christian Church, or with any aspect of truth, let it be as if unsaid."

Grotius's work shows the immediate influence of the neo-Scholastics, who, even more than Grotius, were responsible for the foundations of international law. Franciscus de Vittoria's *De Jure Belli* and Suarez's *Tractatus de Legibus ac Deo Legislatore* transmit the theory of St. Thomas concerning the just causes of war, which is reformulated and enlarged upon by Grotius. The value of Grotius's work is not so much its originality as its transmission and fulfillment of a tradition—the doctrine of a right to war and peace which had first been comprehensively treated in the writings of St. Augustine.[11]

As law or justice is defined as whatever is conformable to man's nature as a reasonable and social being,[12] the just causes of war can be determined, not by an appeal to the actual practices of nations, but only by showing their consistence with reason. This can be shown, according to Grotius, by two kinds of argument: a priori, when anything may be demonstrated to agree with the dictates of reason, in themselves clear, distinct, and unchangeable; and a posteriori, when, without absolute proof or only upon probability, something may be inferred to agree with the principles of reason because of common consent.[13] One test of the law of war is that

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public as well as private, common to all nations. In the form of external public law it gradually acquired an international character; besides laws governing domestic and property relations, it came to include the law of embassies and the law of the spoils of war. Beginning with rules of equity, for the correction of the Roman *jus civile*, the law of nations developed into a system of universal common law, with a broader connotation than the modern law of nations, which is exclusively international. During the Middle Ages, the law of nations was interpreted as universal common law. By the time of Grotius it began to be restricted in meaning to international law and to be limited to the relations between sovereign states.

[11]John Eppstein, *The Catholic Tradition of the Law of Nations*, (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1935), pp. 65 ff.

[12]Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, Book I, Chap. 1, sec. 3. In agreement with St. Thomas and St. Augustine before him, there is no distinction, for Grotius, between law and justice, so that a law that is not just is no law at all.

[13]*Ibid.*, sec. 12.

[14]*Ibid.*, Book II, Chap. 1, sec. 2.

[15]*Ibid.*, sec. 5.

it is accepted as such by the more civilized nations. Yet the general consent is not necessarily rational, as Grotius acknowledges, so that it is not a sufficient justification of the conventions governing war.

The result of Grotius's distinction between the will and the law of nations was to delimit the conditions of a just war and to question the will of nations for sanctioning wars which, by the light of reason, must be deemed to be unjust. Reason, alone, is incapable of bringing peace to the world unless supported by the will of nations. Yet the latter permits injustices which the law of nations, strictly applied, would find intolerable. Thus, whenever the justice of war is founded exclusively upon consent, there may be wars in which each side appears to have an equal claim to justice and in which neither side appears unjust. Although there is no law which commands us, under the same circumstances, both to do and to abstain, in matters of disputed right it is the custom to charge neither side with injustice. Yet to argue that wars may occur in which neither side is unjust or both sides are just is to confuse, according to Grotius, the consent of nations with the laws which ought to govern them. To assume that no act is lawful or unlawful but that consent makes it so is inconsistent with the rule of reason—by which human acts are just or unjust independently of our judgments of them.

For Grotius, peace is the fundamental right of man, although the idea of a just war is not self-contradictory. There is a law of war, in addition to a law of peace, for not every war is unjust. War is not only the enemy of peace; it is also the principal means of its enforcement. Right reason prohibits only that use of war which unjustly deprives another of his right. The first and necessary concern of society, for Grotius, is not the wisdom and virtue of its members, as it was for Aristotle and St. Thomas, but the maintenance of elemental human rights with the help of a common power.

The most basic of human rights is that of self-defense. Although this right is limited to the defense of life and limb and does not extend to the defense of other human rights, such as the right to property or liberty, to this extent nations are justified in repelling force by arms. Besides the right to self-defense, war is justified in reparation for damages and in punishment for crime.[14] Every person has a right to defend and recover goods which lawfully belong to him and to have criminals brought to justice. Yet war is justified only against an actual aggressor. Threats to our person and property, or the knowledge of plots being formed against us in preparation of war or ambuscade, are not sufficient conditions of waging war.[15] Most wars have their origin in fear, although fear cannot justify anticipatory slaying as a method of preventing harm to oneself.

The same judicial means of settling disputes within the state are ap-

plicable between states, the difference being that in the case of internal controversies there is a common judge, whereas in the case of a general war each party is judge in its own behalf. Although the analogy between state and international law is somewhat misleading because of the absence of a common judge and a common power to enforce justice, the civil and criminal laws judging violations of right within each state may be justly extended to govern similar violations of law between states. As within each state civil law judges violations of right by the method of reparation, and criminal law by the method of punishment, so between states wars of reparation and punishment may also be justified.

Yet the conditions of a just war, according to Grotius, are subject to the qualification that in defending oneself against aggression, enforcing reparation, or punishing the enemy there is not cause for still greater injustice. The right to war is limited by the right to peace, so that injustice should be tolerated for the sake of even greater justice. When the outcome of war is uncertain, there are reasonable precautions against rashly engaging in it. Self-preservation may justify forbearing hostilities against an aggressor or surrendering to an enemy of vastly superior strength. To punish a wrong or to assert a right by resort to arms is imprudent without the possession of superior force. If in pursuing a just cause the means are adequate to the end but are likely to cause a greater amount of evil than good, then peace is preferable to victory. When the injustice occasioned by the calamities of war is likely to outweigh the justice to be attained by its successful conclusion, it is not only imprudent but unjust, according to Grotius, to wage war.[16]

War is unjustified, in accordance with the law of nations, except on grounds of self-defense, reparation, or punishment. Yet wars of reparation and punishment are frequently unjust because of the sacrifice in human life required in waging them. In practice, the only lawful cause of war is imperious necessity, when the failure to wage war is likely to be followed by calamities far more unjust.[17] Grotius's conditions of a just war are not of equal weight. The right of self-defense is fundamental, and there is little justification in waging a war of reparation or punishment in violation of it.

Wars justified by the law of nations seldom correspond to the wars actually waged by men. Not only aggressive but many so-called defensive wars are unjust, according to Grotius, because they result in a loss of life far outweighing the losses occasioned by an unfavorable peace. Wars in self-

[16] *Ibid.*, Chap. 24, sec. 5.
[17] *Ibid.*, secs. 7-8.
[18] *Ibid.*, sec. 1.
[19] *Ibid.*, *Prolegomena*, sec. 25.
[20] *Ibid.*, Book III, Chap. 4, sec. 3.
[21] *Ibid.*, Chap. 10, sec. 1.

defense may be unjustified if they cannot be waged except by inordinate sacrifices in human life.[18] Only those wars are, in practice, defensive which entail less sacrifice in human life in waging them than in surrender. Loss of property, as a result of domination by a hostile power, is not itself sufficient cause of waging a defensive war. War is justified against the threat of racial and national genicide or against semi-civilized peoples with barbarous propensities—but scarcely otherwise. Between civilized nations, a war in self-defense is a contradiction in terms—for the right to property rather than life is threatened, and the best means of self-defense, under such circumstances, is surrender.

In order that wars may be wholly justified, the means of waging them should also be just. Wars should be carried on with not less scrupulousness than judicial processes in accordance with civil law.[19] When arms have once been taken up, even in accordance with a just cause, there is seldom any respect for law. The will of nations is sufficiently lax to permit the infliction of injury upon all persons residing in enemy territory. This power to inflict injury extends over women and children, over hostages and civilians, and even over those who have surrendered unconditionally. By the will of nations, the prerogative of killing extends to all persons who may be considered enemies.[20] It is permissible to kill the enemy or damage his property, not merely for him who wages war for a just cause but for either side indiscriminately.

Yet how is it, asks Grotius, that murder committed by individuals is considered a crime but, if committed on a grand scale and sanctioned by public authority, is done with impunity? Acts of public violence and pillage meet with the approval of nations because it is dangerous to the security of other nations to judge them. It is also well-nigh impossible to know what the just limits are of self-defense, reparation, or punishment in any given case. The unqualified right to kill or harm the enemy is based entirely upon considerations of expediency, although what is expedient is not necessarily lawful—even if it does meet with the approval of nations. Although Grotius first considers acts which are lawful or permissible, in the loose sense of the term, as what may be done with impunity, he afterwards retraces his steps in denying the lawfulness or permissiveness of those same acts, as they deviate from the principle of justice.[21]

There are duties which must be performed even toward our enemies. Persons residing in enemy territority may not be killed at random. It is a law of nations that war should be conducted so that crimes may be remedied and corrected but not so as to involve the innocent in the same punishment as the guilty—even those who are guilty are to be spared for

the sake of the innocent.[22] In accordance with this law, children should always be spared and old men and women, too, unless they have been guilty of extremely serious offenses. Those engaged in peaceful pursuits, such as farmers and merchants, even though their labor should provide the enemy with the means of waging war, should be spared. Hostages and prisoners of war and those who have surrendered unconditionally should be spared. Reason does not sanction punishment except against those who have done wrong, and in just proportion to it. That killing a man may be just, it is necessary that he who is killed should not only have wronged another but in a manner punishable by death and on the decision of an impartial spectator.[23] As those who are responsible for a war are more guilty than their subjects, who are forced into their service, it is unlawful that they should suffer the same kind and degree of punishment. It is only by a sort of fiction that the enemy may be conceived as forming a single body or sharing equally in the guilt deserving of punishment.[24]

To the conditions of a just war must be added, therefore, that, in the course of waging it, the innocent should not be made to suffer unjustly. By implication, wars should be carried on in the open field or in desolate areas removed from the centers of civilization. That the enemy is unwilling to abide by the laws of war is no argument that one should also violate them. Should they be violated, wars originally undertaken for defense would also be aggressive and so cease to be justified. War, according to Grotius, is a means of settling differences that cannot be settled amicably and is analogous to the duel as a means of settling differences in private life. In accordance with the formal conditions of a duel, so also should wars be conducted with dignity. As in private life the well-being of innocent bystanders is given precedence over the capture of armed criminals, so also in wars between nations care should be taken not to risk the lives of innocent civilians. It is generally better, according to Grotius, to protect the innocent than to punish the guilty. As the principle of justice requires the least sacrifice of human rights, it obliges us to risk the lives of the innocent only as it is necessary to protect the lives of many more.

War is justified, in accordance with the law of nations, on the satisfaction of at least three conditions: (1) that one is the object of aggression; (2) that, on the supposition of surrender, there is likely to be more injustice, on the whole, than with a victory over the enemy (taking into

[22] *Ibid.*, sec. 8.
[23] *Ibid.*, Chap. 11, sec. 2.
[24] *Ibid.*, sec. 16.
[25] St. Thomas, *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 40, a. 1; trans. Dominican Fathers, Vol. 9.
[26] Grotius, *De Jure Belli ac Pacis*, Book I, Chap. 4, sec. 2.
[27] *Ibid.*, sec. 7.
[28] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 40, a. 1; trans. Dominican Fathers, Vol. 9.

consideration the injustice of warfare and the possible death of innocent persons); and (3) that victory is partly guaranteed by superior force so that the likelihood of defeat is negligible. These conditions are cited by Grotius in the course of a chapter entitled "Warnings Not to Undertake War Rashly, Even for Just Causes." Although influenced by considerations of expediency or the consequences of human actions, they are correctly associated with a law of nations grounded upon reason rather than consent. The restricted use of war, in accordance with the law of nations, is defensible only as a last resort necessary to the preservation of human society.

Grotius's conditions of a just war are largely a reformulation of those of St. Thomas, although they also constitute a refinement upon them. St. Thomas had argued that war is justified only in order to prevent injustice—although once war is justified it may be directed to removing the conditions which gave rise to it. The first condition of a just war, according to St. Thomas, is that it should be commanded by a sovereign, so that all privately declared wars are unjust.[25] This condition is acknowledged by Grotius in his discussion of the right of revolution, although it is not included among the principal conditions limiting the use of war. It is not permissible, according to Grotius, for either private or official persons to wage war against the sovereign; as civil society was instituted for the purpose of maintaining peace, the state has the right to limit the natural right of resistance.[26] By the principle of justice men are obliged to disobey a sovereign who commands them to act unjustly but may be bound to submit to him when he treats them unjustly. There is a distinction, for Grotius, between disobedience of rightful authority and rebellion. It is permissible to flee from unjust persecution and even to defend oneself by force of arms when so attacked but, as a general rule, never to rebel or seek to overthrow that authority. There is but one exception to this rule, and that is when resistance could be made without great disturbance or injury to a great many innocent people, on the assumption that even the original formulators of the social contract would have allowed such a right in case of imperious necessity.[27]

The second condition of a just war, according to St. Thomas, is that hostilities should begin because of some fault or crime on the part of the enemy, and for the purpose of punishing or repairing wrongs.[28] As Grotius interprets this condition, war is justified only if one is the object of aggression. It is unnecessary that the enemy's aggression take the form of military hostilities against one's own nation; for, Grotius argues, war may be justly undertaken by one nation in defense of the oppressed of other nations, even when those nations are guilty of crimes only against their own subjects. In such an event, the aggressor is the nation whose hostilities

are directed against its own citizens; and the nation which comes to their succor, the defender of their lives and property. Unlike St. Thomas, however, Grotius argued that wars are seldom justified unless directed to self-defense, so that they need not have for their just intent the punishment or reparation of wrongs. Theoretically, wars of reparation and punishment are justified; practically, there are few instances in which the cost of waging such wars can be justified, even with the victory they bring.

St. Thomas's third condition is that war, to be justified, should have as its rightful intention the advancement of good or the avoidance of evil.[29] If a war should be declared by a legitimate authority and in response to hostilities by another power, it may yet be rendered unjust through a wrong intention. This condition of St. Thomas corresponds to Grotius's second and third conditions of a just war. Although intention, for St. Thomas, is an act of the will, it presupposes an act of intellect ordaining actions to a particular end. The intention of the end is the same act as the willing of the means, so that intention implies choice and deliberation about the means necessary to secure its end.[30] Should the consequence of surrendering to an unjust enemy be more conducive to the greatest amount of justice, on the whole, than victory consequent upon the waging of war, then the intention to wage war is unjust. The intention of a just end cannot be disassociated from its particular means, so that war is justified only if victory is worth the cost in human lives and is itself partly guaranteed by the possession of superior force.

War between nations is justified almost exclusively on the basis of man's right to self-defense. Reparation and punishment, as Grotius rightly argued, seldom justify war on their behalf. Yet Grotius's conditions of a just war are sufficiently lax to permit war without recourse to arbitration. To St. Thomas's and Grotius's three conditions of a just war should be added a fourth, that all war should be consistent with the decisions of an international court of justice. The Jesuit Father Taparelli d'Azeglio has argued that war is justified on the ground of punishment only when it is in fact international punishment; within the state, private persons are not allowed a right of punishment, so that neither is such a right applicable between states.[31] As what is true of the criminal law is also true of the civil law, wars of reparation are also unjustified except on the judgment of a common authority. By this argument, the rejection of arbitration becomes the test of aggression, and war declared by a state on its own authority is unjustified.

[29] *Ibid.*

[30] *Ibid.*, I-II, q. 12, a. 4; Vol. 6.

[31] Eppstein, *Catholic Tradition*, pp. 131 and 169.

The George Holmes Howison Lecture, 1956

DESMOND J. FITZGERALD, *University of San Francisco*

On May 9, Reverend I. M. Bochenski, O.P., professor of philosophy, University of Fribourg, and visiting professor at the University of Notre Dame, delivered the 1956 "Howison Lecture" in philosophy at the University of California. The title of the lecture was "Logic and Philosophy."

Sketching the history of the relationship of logic and philosophy, Father Bochenski noted that the growth and development of formal logic has not been one of constant progression but has rather come in three waves with long periods of stagnation in between. The waves of successful activity were the Greek period from Aristotle to the Stoics, the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries of the Scholastic period, and the modern period dating from Boole but largely developing since the turn of the present century.

Until this last period logicians were philosophers and most philosophers at least taught logic—with certain exceptions such as Cicero, Descartes, the humanists, and contemporary existentialists, who, like Jaspers, have attacked logic. In the twentieth century we have witnessed some logicians in their positivism attacking philosophy and other philosophers attacking modern logic in their misunderstanding of it as quantitative or in their objections to material implication. While logic and ontology have been of influence upon one another (the ontology stemming from Plato emphasized a logic of predicates over against a logic of propositions, and Kant's ignorance of the variety of sentences led to falsity in the table of his categories), Professor Bochenski stressed that as logic develops it outgrows its ontological influences. A highly developed formal logic is ontologically neutral.

Father Bochenski criticized the attackers of modern logic such as Jaspers and Veatch as men who did not understand it. He insisted instead that logic should be allowed to develop in an ontologically neutral atmosphere. Then, since logic is vital to philosophy, let philosophers learn and use symbolic logic as their instrument in the analysis of such problems as analogy.

The "Howison Lecture" in philosophy is a memorial to George Holmes Howison, the turn-of-the-century idealist who headed the philosophy department at Berkeley. The list of the previous lecturers in the series is like a roll-call of American and British philosophers, starting in the 1920's with Professors Hocking, Lovejoy, Montague, Perry, C. I. Lewis, and, more recently, George Boas, Brand Blanshard, Gilbert Ryle, and Walter Stace. Father Bochenski is the thirtieth person and the first Scholastic to give the lecture.

Thirtieth Annual Meeting of the American Catholic Philosophical Association

MAURICE R. HOLLOWAY, S.J., *Saint Louis University*

The American Catholic Philosophical Association held its thirtieth annual meeting on April 3 and 4, 1956, at Cincinnati, Ohio. Greetings were extended to the members by the Most Reverend Karl J. Alter, Archbishop of Cincinnati. The general theme of the meeting was the role played by the various philosophical disciplines in a Catholic liberal education. In his presidential address, "Wisdom and Science," Vincent E. Smith, of the University of Notre Dame, made the point that while metaphysics is valuable in organizing the purely secular knowledges of a Catholic liberal education, it can never organize a Catholic curriculum as Catholic. For this purpose sacred theology is needed, a wisdom whose subject is the God of revelation. The role of logic in such an education was discussed by the Reverend Henri DuLac, also of the University of Notre Dame. Father DuLac saw four principal benefits of logic for the Catholic student: (1) it gains for him confidence in the orderly use of his reasoning power, (2) it gives him a respect for exactness, (3) it helps him to define carefully, and (4) it teaches him to reason in a manner suitable to the subject matter. And Father DuLac pointed out that if sacred theology and philosophy are essential to a Catholic liberal education, the logic on which the learning of them depends is likewise essential. In his paper, "The Meaning of Jean Jacques Rousseau and the Structure of Political Theory" (a most provocative and interesting essay, but one not really on the general topic of the meeting), Father Charles N. R. McCoy, of the Catholic University of America, explained the meaning and import of Rousseau's identification of the autonomy of man's intellect with the autonomy of man's nature. Since nature contains within itself no principle of intelligence, man, as part of the natural cosmos, becomes a center of self-creativeness that is infinitely malleable, being reduced in the line of his pure autonomy of nature to a simple indeterminateness with respect to some possible form. Such forms will be imposed upon man by the force of revolution and the absolute state; man will no longer be guided by a theoretical intellect with its abstract forms of consciousness, forms which only alienate man from himself and his pure autonomy of nature. What this theory does to the traditional and normative ethics which considers man as a rational animal was briefly highlighted.

In his paper, "The Role of the Philosophy of Nature in Catholic Liberal Education," Father Benedict Ashley, O.P., discussed the precise nature and

method of the philosophy of nature, its relation to and distinction from the positive sciences, and its educational value. The method of demonstration that is proper to the science of mobile and sensible being need not proceed always through intrinsic formal and material causes but may also legitimately proceed through some substitute for these, some sign or effect, or some extrinsic cause. And while such demonstrations fall short of the certitude attained in mathematics and metaphysics, they lead, nevertheless, to conclusions that are genuinely certain. Father Ashley gave as examples the principal theses that St. Thomas derived from such works of Aristotle as the *Physics*, *De Generatione et Corruptione* I and *De Anima*, which are, in the form given them by the Angelic Doctor, genuine demonstrations whose certitude cannot be impugned by the hypothetical systems of positive science. The positive sciences themselves do not aim at certitude and are dialectical instruments of the philosophy of nature, with their roots firmly fixed in the certitudes of this latter science and continuing the same investigations of this science, with its conclusions, however, not becoming confused with the conclusions of philosophy. Finally, Father Ashley maintained, the role of the philosophy of nature in a liberal education is an essential one, since it constitutes an indispensable condition for both moral philosophy and metaphysics. The former borrows principles from psychology, a part of the philosophy of nature; and the latter, while not borrowing any principles from the philosophy of nature and being, therefore, formally independent of it, is, nevertheless, materially dependent on sense experience whence it derives its principles of being. The last part of the paper describes how this philosophical view of science, taking full advantage of the progress of modern science, is gradually introduced to the Catholic student in an experimental curriculum being used at St. Xavier College, Chicago.

Edwin C. Garvey, C.S.B., of the Assumption University of Windsor, in his paper, "The Role of Metaphysics in a Catholic Liberal College," insisted on the following points. (1) Of all the parts of philosophy, metaphysics should be learned last, and it will be learned only with great labor and by a chosen few; hence, a formal course in metaphysics should come in the senior year in college, and be given (for a full year) only to those majoring in philosophy. (2) Metaphysics will play its integrating role if the teacher is inspired by a vision of unity and can lead his students toward this vision, indicating the method and meaning of the main conclusions of metaphysics, preparing the student's intellect for the insights into being as being, which are proper to this science. Until the natural intellect of the student has been properly prepared for the abstract intuition of being as being through courses in logic, the history of philosophy, cos-

mology, psychology, ethics, and so forth, any attempt at an introductory course in metaphysics would result either in empiricism, where metaphysics becomes simply a perceptual experience of existing things, or in common-sense knowledge, lacking ontological insight into the necessities of being as being.

The association address was delivered by Mortimer J. Adler, of the Institute for Philosophical Research, San Francisco. His topic was "Controversy in the Life and Teaching of Philosophy." Mr. Adler submits that philosophers have rarely, if ever, joined issue in any rational debate; for they have really failed to disagree due to a lack of minimal topical agreements that are prerequisites for genuine disagreement. That is to say, they fail to agree on their understanding of the subject under discussion and of the precise question concerning it. Genuine controversies can, however, be constructed from the materials of actual historical controversies, but this requires a method that is quite distinct from the philosophical inquiry itself. This construction, Mr. Adler said, is completely neutral to the truth or falsity of the opinions involved on each side and formulates these opinions in a language and vocabulary acceptable to both sides. The aim of such constructions is to give a true picture of the controversy itself that underlies the diversity of two opposing philosophical doctrines.

In the general business session, held the morning of April 4, a new constitution and bylaws were adopted. The president for the coming year is the Reverend George P. Klubertanz, S.J., and the vice-president is the Reverend Allan Wolter, O.F.M. Next year's meeting will be held on April 23 and 24, in Chicago.

BOOK REVIEWS

LEONARD A. WATERS, S.J., *St. Stanislaus Seminary*

Aesthetics and Criticism. By Harold Osborne. New York: Philosophical Lib., 1955. Pp. 341. $6.00.

The author of *Aesthetics and Criticism* is an aesthetician of the psychological school and an enthusiastic admirer of Mr. Cleanth Brooks and "organic unity". He is, also, a man justly alarmed at the "massive befuddlement and obfuscation" everywhere evident in criticism owing to

"sheer muddled thinking" in the aesthetics behind it. Earlier (1952) he wrote a book, *Theory of Beauty*, to propose a "configurational" theory of beauty which he is now supporting by presenting it as the only firm foundation for a consistent and effective criticism.

Mr. Osborne's theory is built upon "the contention that a beautiful work of art is a configuration such that its constituent parts could not have existed except as parts of precisely that whole of which they were in fact parts" (p. 240). These words describe "organic unity" and so indicate the kind of whole which practical criticism must seek to discover in an art work.

I am happily in agreement with Mr. Osborne both in his appeal for aesthetics and in his enthusiasm for "organic unity." It is refreshing to find a critic looking for standards in a fog of relativism, and much that Mr. Osborne writes is new and wise. The criticism I shall make of his metaphysics does not invalidate the great usefulness of the book in its survey of the ordinary schools of criticism and the positive results of psychological research in aesthetics.

"Organic unity" is a romantic word—Coleridge's word, and its implications were originally metaphysical—vaguely idealist, and (through the Schlegels) Aristotelian and Scholastic—but at any rate metaphysical. In modern usage by, and since, the new critics, however, it has lost its metaphysical connotation and has become a scientific word. Science has so completely overwhelmed metaphysics that modern thinkers, even when they decide to explore the ultimate causes of things, succeed in being no more than scientific. This is unfortunately true of Mr. Osborne's analysis, too, since for him metaphysics is neither valid nor useful knowledge. So, in his "Apologia for Aesthetics," he can say, "At one extreme aesthetics merges into metaphysics and to the extent to which it is metaphysical aesthetics is profitless to practise" (p. 25). And, "The traditional method of definition in the philosophy of the humanities is to start with an abstract formulation, conjured out of empty air, which is supposed to delimit the essence or quiddity of the field of phenomena which is to be considered" (p. 41). Thus it is enough to say of any theory as he says of expressionism: "It is subject in all its forms to the basic weakness of all metaphysical theories of aesthetics: it can neither be verified nor serve as a practical guide to criticism" (p. 54). And historically "[Aristotle] also held a teleological view of reality which has practically disappeared from contemporary thought. He believed that everything—including human beings—has a 'form' which both makes it what it is and is the goal of perfection toward which it tends" (p. 94). And, "Throughout the Middle Ages the aesthetic consciousness lay crushed and dormant in all Christendom" (p. 54).

Finally he can write: "Chapter VI ["Hieratic Hedonism"] *'id quod visum placet'*—St. Thomas Aquinas" (p. 111), in which chapter St. Thomas is not discussed. (He is given a one-page "treatment" in another chapter.)

How can Mr. Osborne write *Aesthetics and Criticism,* feeling as he does about metaphysics? The answer is in his "Apologia":

> We do not mean to deny the value and legitimacy of such metaphysical theorization for the metaphysician. But aesthetics has suffered too much from premature speculation about the cosmic significance of beauty before anyone has understood what we mean when we talk about beauty or what criteria we may use to detect it. We shall here be concerned only with the surer if more pedestrian range of critical aesthetics.

"Critical aesthetics," then, which does not depend upon metaphysics and yet is the foundation for criticism by being a scientific study of the data of criticism is the meaning of aesthetics in this book.

No one can deny that Mr. Osborne has struck home. What we have suffered from metaphysical theorization is not pleasant to think about. And yet, the great weakness in this book seems to me to be the author's attempt to escape from the metaphysical. Unfortunate as our experience with metaphysics has been, we can no more decree metaphysics for the metaphysicians only than we can restrict the atom to the physicist only. One *must* talk of ultimate reality if he is to be scholarly in a discussion of form, emotion, mimesis, interpretation, and the rest. Conversely, without a metaphysical position, Mr. Osborne is constantly being forced to use the scientific method in conducting analyses which can only be meaningful from a metaphysical viewpoint. Thus, his understanding of Aristotle's "mimesis," for example, is scandalously unscholarly. Imitation means a mechanical copy. A mechanical copy is ridiculous as an explanation of art; and thus a "whipping boy" technique is set up to stigmatize all realists as photographic imitators. The same objection may be taken to the author's view of emotionalists. Because emotions are "autobiographical" and art is "objective," all who speak of emotions as connected with one's judgment of art are simply unscientific. Similarly, the critic who appeals to anything beyond scientific categories is evidently a "transcendentalist" and so self-condemned as a philosopher rather than an aesthetician.

In support of his own configurational theory of "organic unity" Mr. Osborne consistently uses the same scientific method, and it makes mincemeat of a theory that has real metaphysical value and power. Art, in this system, means simply "form or structure or configuration" and beauty is the coefficient of this formal structure (p. 225). Thus art is autotelic—independent of any real life object and of any viewer's emotions. However, a

work must have "the right kind" of structure if it is to be beautiful. The right kind is organic. But at this point science leads to confusion. How are we to know the right from the wrong kind of structure, and why is organic the right kind? Science leads the author to believe that no two men ever actuate the same poem; so it is manifestly no more than a theoretical question to ask how we may know organic form when we see it (p. 233). And to get at the question of why organic unity is beautiful, science might suggest a "tropism"—an instinctive and alogical desire for configuration (p. 227); but the author goes beyond this to suggest that the experience of beauty is valued "because it makes us more vividly alive than we otherwise know how to be" (p. 229). Evidently the whole question of the relation of reality to the mind and the whole human reaction—intellectual, imaginative, emotional—to a bit of reality is back again. It must return. Art inevitably involves metaphysics, and a scientific analysis is not merely incomplete; it is false.

As long as *being* in itself is not recognized as the only satisfying object of the human intellect, the fatal dichotomy of man and object is introduced. I am forever isolated and things are forever apart from me, foreign, and incapable of moving me. Until the human grasp of things is presented as a knowledge and simultaneously a love of them, a wedding in which the mind becomes one with the thing known, beauty will forever elude us. The scientist can categorize. He can list qualities and reactions, set up any number of elaborate and strictly observed recordings of data. But the appeal of beauty will forever be uncategorized. It transcends all categories; it is felt intuitively in the first direct grasp of reality and it continues to be felt in the same way through the most complex experience of art. If this is what Mr. Osborne calls "mysticism" then beauty is mystic. But in no scholarly estimate is this to be confused with that real or assumed direct spiritual grasp of spirit outside the normal process of knowing. This is simply the fullness of the normal process. Grasp of beauty is grasp of beings with their full capacity to possess, to wed, to fecundate the human spirit in a state of joy and satisfaction which is part of the mystery of man himself.

Finally, to have no metaphysics is to have no certitude with which one may speak of form and matter as principles of being itself. And it is with *being* we must deal when we criticize artefacts as beautiful or ugly. With no tools but scientific categories one is bound to fall into the error of talking about form as if it were no more than external structure, and content as if it existed in the art work apart from the form in which it is apprehended. It is ridiculous to speak as if the content made no difference in art; but it is perfectly true, as A. C. Bradley says, that it *settles* nothing

in art. Likewise, no category of structure can ever be isolated such that it defines or specifies beauty in itself. But if "form" is metaphysical form, a principle of the being itself and inseparable from the matter, then "organic" form or organic unity can never be discussed as a category of things. It is simply the denial of any category, any mechanical or mathematical structure which is adequate to describe the beautiful thing. It is organic in that it is "natural," "live," rather than an abstraction of the mind.

In all of this Mr. Osborne is as anxious as I to preserve the wholeness, the immediacy, and the intuitive quality of art experience. "Organic unity" we are both defending. His chapters written against "realists," "emotionalists," and even "transcendentalists" are inadequate simply because his scientific viewpoint forces him to say, or to seem to say, that neither reality nor psychology can be concerned in the analysis of beauty. Rather, because reality is wedded to mind in the grasp of beauty, any theoretical position which parts them is wrong. A metaphysical position will strengthen "organic unity," not by setting it up in isolation as a rival to realism or transcendentalism, but by refusing to let any particle of impression, expression, imitation, or analysis of art be isolated from the whole, human, vital unique experience which is the art experience. In this way criticism can be permanently clarified and supported by aesthetics.

JAMES COLLINS, *Saint Louis University*

***L'Analytique transcendantale de Kant.* Tome I, *La Critique kantienne.* By A. De Coninck. Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1955. Pp. 327.**

The plan of this book is to introduce us to Kant's critical philosophy in its main lines. The author does this by analyzing the first two sections of the *Critique of Pure Reason,* the transcendental aesthetic and the transcendental analytic. There are two usual ways of going about the task of initiating students to this book. One is to make a strict commentary on the topics in their actual order of introduction in the text, and another is to discuss in a systematic way certain major themes which it would be well to know before plunging into the reading of the original source. De Coninck has happily chosen to employ both these methods, first giving a general explanation of Kant's position and then offering a brief commentary on the actual text.

The general explanation gives a preliminary orientation in Kant's standpoint. It describes concisely the point of departure of the first *Critique*

in a certain view of human knowledge, its objective of explaining the conditions for making valid synthetic a-priori judgments, and its method of transcendental analysis. On each point a common procedure is followed. First a summary statement is made of the Kantian doctrine; then a number of illustrative texts from Kant himself are furnished; and finally a more detailed study is made of the aspects of the problem. Perhaps a fifth of the book is reserved for source readings, which are usually given both in the original and in the author's translation, in parallel columns. For the French student, these readings provide an invaluable invitation to approach the original work. And since the author is very conscientious in his translations, they will be interesting to anyone concerned with finding foreign equivalents for the Kantian terminology. There are also eleven scholia, in which the chief variant meanings are established for such key terms as "transcendental," "objective," "experience," "matter-and-form," and "perception."

In the commentary portion, the author concentrates upon the basic argument, avoiding fine questions pertaining to textual interpretation, Kant's own development, and controversies among the commentators. The meaning of space and time, the two deductions of the categories, and the schematism and principles of the understanding comprise the expected main divisions. Enough information is given to enable the student to take his first bearings in Kantian criticism without plunging him into the bewildering sea of special problems which the text of Kant contains. The approach is almost wholly that of sympathetic exposition, although there are a few instances of critical comment. De Coninck remarks on the ambiguous reference to perception, experience, and objectivity and suggests that Kant sometimes takes unacknowledged advantage of the common realistic meanings. But for the most part, Volume I is a straightforward exposition; in a second volume, the author intends to offer his critical estimate of Kant.

After acknowledging the usefulness of this introduction within its announced limits, it is nevertheless necessary to examine the limits themselves. De Coninck seeks to explain the *Critique of Pure Reason* solely in terms of the aesthetic and the analytic. Although this has been a long-standing tradition among Kantian scholars, there are definite signs recognizing its inadequacy. The trend lately has been to restore to its rightful place of importance the third section of the *Critique*, the dialectic of pure reason, and even to acknowledge the indispensable contribution made by the final part, the doctrine on method. These are not mere applications of the Kantian critique but vital and determining portions of it. They help to finalize the entire work, to give it proper proportions, and to show its

internal relation with the second and third *Critiques*. The imbalance resulting from omission of the dialectic from an introduction to the Kantian critique can be observed in the present work. It finds no occasion to explain the meaning of ideas of reason, the thing-in-itself, dialectic, the kinds of possibility, and the distinction between intuition in general and human intuition. And it gives no guidance to the Kantian arguments on the world, the soul, and God. But these are not peripheral topics. They bring us to the heart of the critical enterprise, and hence some mention of them in a formal way is desirable in an introductory work. In this respect, the recent English commentary by H. W. Cassirer provides a more balanced guide.

MICHAEL MONTAGUE, S.J. *West Baden College*

Morale fondamentale. **By Dom Odon Lottin, O.S.B. Tournai: Desclée & Cie., 1954.**

A book in moral theology would not ordinarily be reviewed in the pages of THE MODERN SCHOOLMAN. But Dom Odon Lottin's *Morale fondamentale* is no ordinary book in moral theology. One of the finest historians of the theological and philosophical thought of the Middle Ages has given us a work which remembers that theology—even moral theology—must live within its natural context of philosophy and dogmatic theology.

The moral theology of many of the Scholastic manuals is often a rootless amalgum of propositions, opinions, and corollaries, capsulized for handy use by the busy confessor. If such works have a place, it is not that of a substitute for moral theology as a science which is both theoretical and practical. The present work takes both aspects into account.

Morality is a relation of conformity or nonconformity between a human act and the norms of morality. Moral theory, which comprises the first four chapters of this book, treats of the human act from the psychological point of view (Chap. 1), with its fundamental property of imputability (Chap. 2), the norms of morality (natural reason, positive law, eternal law, conscience, grace, and faith) (Chap. 3), and the relation between the two which constitutes morality (Chap. 4).

Moral practice, dealing with the problem of organizing a life in conformity with moral theory, works through the formation of the judgment of conscience (Chap. 5) and the formation of the prudential judgment in accord with the natural and supernatural virtues (Chap. 6), to a consideration of sin (Chap. 7) and merit (Chap. 8). The outline is neat and has the tremendous advantage of a presentation which is pedagogically use-

ful as well as methodologically sound. Theology and philosophy, though integrated, remain distinct.

The question of *method* is an important one; and though Lottin is brief in his remarks, he says some things which definitely need to be said.

Moral philosophy is most frequently viewed as a science which is synthetic in structure and deductive in method. Extrapolating from the God of natural theology, many Scholastic ethicians begin by studying the God of natural theology under the aspects of the ultimate norm of good and evil, the foundation of all moral obligation, and the supreme sanctioning source of moral conduct. The remainder of "general ethics" is deduced from these premises. The difficulties with such a deductive procedure are serious. In making moral science a mere corollary of natural theology, one runs the danger of robbing moral science of its autonomy as a special philosophical science. It is true that metaphysically the moral order, as every created order, is dependently related to God. Nevertheless, one cannot conclude that one's knowledge of the moral order depends in its beginnings on a knowledge of God. Conscience offers us a direct and proper knowledge of the first notions in the moral order without appeal to our indirect and analogical knowledge of God. It is true that God is man's last end; it is true that an act is morally good if it is conformed to that last end. But a knowledge of God does not furnish a criterion for knowing whether a particular act is or is not conformed, is or is not obligatory. Furthermore, the philosopher cannot deduce the content of natural law from his essentially imperfect knowledge of the eternal law. Even if this were possible, it would still mislead one into thinking that natural law is imposed entirely from without, a mere participation in eternal law. This moral extrinsicism is simply false and shows up particularly in treating sanction as a reward or punishment imposed from without and tacked on to the moral life. I am not certain, but I suspect that such a deductive procedure in moral philosophy is possible only because of a correspondingly faulty procedure in natural theology.

Lottin chooses—and correctly, I think—to construct a moral philosophy which is methodologically inductive and analytic. This is not to turn ethics into a kind of social physics (after the manner of Durkheim and Levy-Bruhl), whose value would consist only in deciphering the laws which actually have governed the evolution of society and predicting future developments. Moral philosophy is not primarily historical or prophetic.

Moral science must begin with man's experiential contact with the real. Every man possesses a number of spontaneous judgments bearing on the morality or obligation of ordinary acts. These spontaneous judgments lie open to a reflection which analyzes and uncovers the impersonal and im-

mediate norms of morality grounding these judgments. To reach the ultimate foundations of moral goodness and obligation, this inductive analysis must push to its term in God, the exemplar of all morality and obligation. In such a method, however, God is no longer the point of departure but the term.

Though Lottin is writing as a moral theologian, not as a moral philosopher, he believes that in presenting moral theology this inductivo-analytic method of moral philosophy is pedagogically preferable to the deductive method proper to moral theology as a science. The advantages of this procedure are evidenced throughout the book. For example, by working through the psychological structure of the human act in the opening chapter, Lottin has provided the means for an intelligent classification of internal sins (*gaudium* is the *fruitio; desiderium,* the *intentio; delectatio morosa,* the simple volition). The number and species of sins have their basis in the efficient and formal causalities of will and intellect.

The actual analysis of the human act in its various stages is presented in summary form; and for further discussion one must still return to Lottin's earlier studies in the first volume of his *Psychologie et morale aux XIIIe siècles.* The intellect-will relationship is placed in the categories of efficient and formal causes respectively, but no further questions are asked about the types of formal causality (intrinsic or extrinsic) involved. Nor is much attempt made to differentiate the intellect-will relationships as they shift in the various stages of the human act. Reason becomes practical under the influence of the will. The unity of the human act comes from the perduring causal influence of the volitional intention through all the metaphysical moments to the terminal fruition.

Lottin thinks that the well-known schema of Father Gardeil in the *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* of the twelve steps in the psychological process is overly rigid. There is, after all, a consent which is involved in the simple volition as well as in the intention; there can be a command prior, as well as posterior, to choice. Lottin does not look on the act of choice as a composite act of judgmental and volitional elements. The decisive judgment, chronologically prior to choice, can exert its causality on the choice only because of the virtual influence of the intention which directs both intellect and will. There are no reciprocal causalities within the choice itself.

This practical judgment determinative of choice is not the same as the judgment of conscience. The judgment of conscience precedes choice and perdures after the choice, thus embracing the whole field of the activity of natural reason. Nor is this judgment of conscience to be identified with the impersonal, objective, reasoned judgment of right reason (*recta ratio*

is an equivocally ambiguous term). The judgment of conscience corresponds to the judgment of *synesis*, while the judgment of election is the command preceptive of choice. Lottin restates the position he had maintained in his *Principes de morale* on the distinct roles of prudence and conscience, and attacks rather forcefully (and successfully) Deman's recent attempt to absorb conscience into prudence. The formation of the judgment of conscience is not directed by prudence, which enters for the first time into the prudential command immediately preceding choice.

Though this book is not historical, it contains many historical discussions, especially in the notes at the end of each chapter. The majority of these are but summaries of Lottin's fuller investigations reported in his earlier works. The book itself is theological and philosophical, and it is theology and philosophy of a high order. It proves once again, if proof is still needed, that the best theologians and philosophers are those who were first of all thorough-going historians of theology and philosophy.

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